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-Thesis Abstract- 
 
Since Federation Australia had largely regarded Japan as a nation that posed a direct 
threat to its way of life, a view seemingly proved correct in World War Two. Yet by 
the end of the 1950s, a mere fifteen years after the war ended, Australians were 
more positive about their Japanese neighbours than ever before. This thesis seeks to 
explore why public opinion moved so dramatically over these years by studying a 
select series of events, ranging from the Treaty of Peace with Japan to art 
exhibitions, throughout the decade. 
 
 
  
2 | P a g e  
 
-Contents- 
 
Acknowledgements         3 
Abbreviations/Notes on the Text      4 
Introduction         5 
Shaping Public Opinion in the 1950s 
Chapter One                 14 
The Legacy of the Past and the Hope for the Future:  
The 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan 
Chapter Two                 38 
Steps and Stumbles: 
Changes in Public Opinion Towards Japan, 1953-1954 
Chapter Three                 60 
An Image in Ascendancy?  
Australia Views Japan Anew, 1958-1960 
Conclusion                  85 
The Results of a Decade of Change 
Bibliography                 91 
 
 
3 | P a g e  
 
-Acknowledgements- 
 
I would like to thank first and foremost my supervisor, Dr. James Curran, for his 
patience in reading the many drafts I have submitted. I am also immensely grateful 
for his recommendations regarding sources, without which this thesis ultimately 
would have been impossible.  
My thanks also go to the many historians and archival staff I have interacted with 
over the last year. The eagerness of the staff at the Art Gallery of New South Wales 
Archives, the Noel Butlin Archives and the National Archives of Australia to assist 
in my research on my many visits has been greatly appreciated. I also must thank the 
staff at the many libraries I have frequented over the course of my thesis, notably 
Fisher Library, the State Library of NSW, the State Library of Victoria, the National 
Library and the Japan Foundation Library.  
My heartfelt thanks go to my family and friends for their support and assistance. 
They also have my sincerest apologies for having to listen to my many stories, and 
complaints, about my thesis and the 1950s as a whole; they may rest assured I have, 
temporarily, returned to the present era.  
Last, but certainly not least, my sincerest thanks and utmost gratitude goes to 
Catherine. Thankyou for your support and constant words of encouragement over 
the last year, without them this thesis would not be what it is today.   
 
 
 
4 | P a g e  
 
-Abbreviations/Notes on the Text - 
 
A.C.T.U     Australian Council of Trade Unions 
ANZUS     Australia, New Zealand, United States Security  
Treaty 
It should be noted that during negotiations and until the Treaty entered force it was 
commonly referred to as the ‘Pacific Pact’. However for the sake of simplicity this 
Thesis has opted to use the ANZUS abbreviation. 
AGNSW    Art Gallery of New South Wales 
Prior to July the 1
st
 1958, the Art Gallery was known as the ‘National Art Gallery of 
New South Wales’. Whilst this thesis discusses exhibitions on display both before 
and after the name change for the sake of simplicity it will refer to the Gallery 
without the word ‘National’. 
R.S.S & A.I.L.A Returned Sailors', Soldiers' & Airmen's 
Imperial League of Australia 
Prior to 1965 the Returned and Services League of Australia (R.S.L) was officially 
known as the R.S.S & A.I.L.A. Whilst the organisation appears to have been 
commonly referred to as the R.S.L as early as 1953, this thesis will use the official 
R.S.S & A.I.L.A moniker.  
NAA      National Archives of Australia 
U.S     United States 
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-Introduction- 
Shaping Public Opinion in the 1950s  
In August 1958 Prime Minister Robert Menzies opened a display of Japanese Arts 
and Crafts at the famous Sydney department store Mark Foys. Despite the somewhat 
eclectic nature of his audience, which ranged from the Japanese Ambassador to a six 
year old Australian boy who had won the exhibition‟s drawing contest, the message 
of his speech was received without any ambiguity. Menzies declared Japan to be an 
important partner in Australia‟s growth and called upon Australians to „nurture 
every drop of friendship we can‟.1 However seven years prior to this speech 
friendship with Japan was a sentiment felt by very few Australians. Indeed, a 
completely different attitude was voiced when a group of Australian department 
stores refused to stock imported Japanese toys in 1951.
2
 The stark contrast in the 
public response to these events indicates that the 1950s brought major change to not 
only how Japan was viewed by ordinary Australians, but also to the Australia-Japan 
relationship itself. 
The refusal by Australian retailers in 1951 to accept Japanese toy imports stemmed 
not only from lingering wartime hatred of Japan but from a deeply ingrained 
conviction that Japan represented a threat to Australia, a conviction that had been 
forged at the time Australian became a nation. When Australia federated in 1901 it 
did so at a time when racial theories, such as Social Darwinism, were in wide 
                                                          
1
 The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 August 1958. 
 
2
 Reports of the boycott, its participants and its supporters can be found in the following newspapers: 
The Sunday Herald, 2 September 1951; The Sydney Morning Herald,23 August 1958. 
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circulation.
3
 Such racial theories became married to Australia‟s longstanding fears 
of Asia, born of its geographical isolation, with the result that Australian national 
identity was increasingly forged in opposition to Asia. Japan was an added stimulus 
to this process as its rapidly increasing political, economic and military strength 
raised Australian fears of a possible threat to their fledgling nation. These fears were 
brought to a head when, in 1905, Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. 
The victory was the first defeat of a major European imperialist power by an Asian 
country and seemed to confirm Australia‟s worst fears; Asia was rising, and 
quickly.
4
 The following years saw fears of Japan become entrenched in Australian 
society, with the result that Japan was almost always represented in popular culture 
as a nation desiring to expand south in a movement that would threaten Australia‟s 
living standards and its identity as a racially and culturally homogenous nation.
5
 
Over time these fears became an intrinsic part of the identity Australians ascribed to 
Japan, an identity that this thesis calls the „antagonistic‟ image of Japan. Quite 
simply, from Federation onwards the image that Australians most commonly 
associated with Japan was one of a nation that posed a potential threat to Australian 
security and way of life. This image was reinforced in World War Two and 
remained a powerful influence on public opinion regarding Japan throughout the 
1950s. The 1951 boycott attests to this influence and shows that for Australians at 
the beginning of the 1950s Japan remained a nation who threatened their own. 
                                                          
3
 Neville Meaney, „Britishness and Australia: Some reflections‟, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 31, no.2, p.126. 
 
4
 Russell McGregor, „The Necessity of Britishness: Ethno-cultural roots of Australian Nationalism‟, 
Nations and Nationalism, 12, no.3 (2006), p.500. 
 
5
 Pam Oliver and Michael Ackland eds., Unexpected Encounters: Neglected Histories behind the 
Australia-Japan Relationship (Victoria: Monash Asia Institute 2007), p.17. 
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Changing public opinion regarding Japan would subsequently prove to be a difficult 
task.  
Change did come, however, and by 1958 Australians were not only buying Japanese 
goods but were seeing regular displays of Japanese culture at events such as Mark 
Foys Exhibition. It will be this thesis‟s contention that the principal reason for this 
shift in public opinion was that the decade had seen a new image of Japan emerge 
and begin to exert considerable influence over public opinion, an image this thesis 
calls the „complementary‟ image of Japan. Whilst the fears that lay at the heart of 
the antagonistic image of Japan made changes, such as greater trade with Japan, 
distasteful to the Australian public, it could not remove the reality that such change 
was inevitable. What the influence of this image did do, however, was demand that 
where change must occur it should be limited to avoid threatening Australia, and 
thus greater trade was accepted under the condition it be strictly regulated. As more 
of these limited changes occurred they gave rise to a view that Japan did not 
necessarily threaten Australia, but rather could offer significant benefits to 
Australia‟s development. Thus the complementary image of Japan was born. Over 
time this image grew in influence as both the Australian and Japanese government 
adopted the image and began to vigorously promote it. The expansion of this new, 
positive image of Japan was also assisted by the ever present fears of Communism 
and Japan‟s startling economic growth, indeed by the closing years of the 1950s 
Australians frequently expressed admirations for Japan‟s achievements as a modern 
nation. Yet at no point did this complementary image entirely displace the older 
antagonistic image of Japan, instead the two were engaged in an exceptionally 
complex relationship. The growth in influence of the new image of Japan, which 
presented closer contact with Japan as a positive development, hinged on change 
8 | P a g e  
 
appearing limited and unthreatening. In short, its growth was both enabled and 
constrained by the influence of the antagonistic image of Japan. Whilst seemingly 
schizophrenic the association of multiple images with another nation is actually, as 
Akira Iriye has noted, quite common amongst individuals.
6
 Yet for over fifty years 
such plurality had been absent from the Australian public‟s perception of Japan. The 
emergence in the 1950s of the complementary image thus positioned the decade as a 
crucial one for public opinion regarding Japan. By the 1960s such plurality resulted 
in the Australian public simultaneously feeling sentiments of „sympathy and 
satisfaction‟ as well as „suspicion and fear‟ towards Japan.7  
Today Japan is one of Australia‟s closest allies and consequently there have been a 
wide variety of historical accounts on the Australia-Japan relationship during the 
1950s. Although this thesis undeniably owes much to the research of these historians, 
studies of the shifts in public opinion regarding Japan, and the reasons for them, 
have been conspicuously absent from the existing literature. Studies on the 
relationship have largely focused on the events which drove change at the 
Government level, and figures such as Alan Rix and Peter Drysdale have argued that 
the increasing value of the Australia-Japan trade drove the Australian government to 
foster a better relationship with Japan.
8
 Whilst largely eschewing discussion of 
public opinion Drysdale has noted that Australia and Japan shared certain cultural, 
                                                          
6
 Akira Iriye ed., Mutual Images: Essays in American-Japanese relations (Cambridge : Harvard 
University Press, 1975), p.20. 
 
7
 Richard Broinowski , „Australian Perceptions of Japan‟, in Harold Bolitho and Alan Rix eds., A 
Northern Prospect: Australian Papers on Japan (Canberra: Japanese Studies Association of 
Australia, 1981), p.192. 
 
8
 Peter Drysdale and Hironuba Kitaoji eds., Japan and Australia : Two Societies and Their 
Interaction (Canberra : Australian National University Press, 1981.), p.5; Alan Rix, Coming to 
Terms: The Politics of Australia’s Trade with Japan 1945-57 (Allen and Unwin North Sydney 
Australia 1986), p.222. 
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institutional and strategic similarities that enabled rapid change in the relationship.
9
 
In comparison, Rix focuses primarily on the trading relationship and has stated that 
where public opinion towards Japan did alter it was due to Australians experiencing 
the benefits of increasing trade; for Rix the role of government is, at best, subsidiary 
to such firsthand experience.
10
 This thesis rejects such a stance and argues that the 
leadership of Government was crucial to facilitating the shift in public opinion 
regarding Japan, a role illustrated by Menzies‟s exhortations to move beyond 
wartime animosity at Mark Foys 1958 exhibition.  
Sandra Tweedie, like Rix, has argued that trade played a major role in stimulating 
changes in the Australia-Japan relationship; however Tweedie has cited the 
international context as the principal driver of change.
11
 Tweedie, and others such as 
David Goldsworthy, believe the rising fear of communism and decolonisation of 
Asia made the government more receptive to change in the Australia-Japan 
relationship than it would have otherwise been. Whilst Goldsworthy extended his 
argument to point out that the communist threat made both the public and the 
Government more open to change in the Australia-Japan relationship, he has failed 
to explore the relationship between government and public opinion.
12
 Such 
explanations also have shown a strong tendency to make change and public 
acceptance seem natural and inevitable, indeed throughout her book „Trading 
Partners’ Tweedie has used a metaphor of „adulthood‟ to explain Australia‟s 
                                                          
9
 Drysdale Kitaoji eds., Japan and Australia, p.1. 
 
10
 Alan Rix, Australia Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present (London: Routledge Australia 
Japan Research Centre, 1999).,p.104. 
 
11
 Sandra Tweedie, Trading Partners : Australia and Asia 1790-1993 (Sydney: New South Wales 
University Press, 1994), pp.142-154. 
 
12
 David Goldsworthy ed., Facing North: A Century Of Australian Engagement With Asia (Victoria: 
Melbourne University Press, 2001), pp.184-190. 
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growing contact with Japan.
13
 Such a metaphor consequently tends to sideline the 
fierce debate in the public over the Australia-Japan relationship, a tendency this 
thesis stands in opposition to. However Tweedie‟s metaphor of adulthood and 
Goldsworthy‟s discussion of the decade have highlighted the major changes the 
decade saw for the Australian public, an argument that this thesis wholeheartedly 
agrees with.
14
  
The works of Neville Meaney and Keiko Tamura stand in sharp contrast to the bulk 
of the literature on the Australia-Japan relationship due to their focus on the ways in 
which the lives of everyday Australians changed during the 1950s. Neville Meaney 
has highlighted the importance of the decade by arguing that the decade saw Japan 
assume a more positive place in the national life of Australia, a point illustrated by 
Mark Foys exhibition.
15
 Meaney has also importantly placed the decade in its proper 
context by noting that whilst changes were significant Australia‟s white, British 
national identity remained strong over this period, thereby demonstrating that 
change to the Australia-Japan relationship was only accepted under certain 
conditions.
16
 However, Meaney has not explained precisely where these limits to 
change lay nor how public acceptance was gained. Keiko Tamura has begun to fill 
this gap through her studies of public responses to the arrival of Japanese war brides. 
Tamura has argued that the public accepted the brides due to their unthreatening 
appearance and perceived ability to assimilate. Through this argument Tamura has 
                                                          
13The two principle chapters in which Tweedie discusses Japan are entitled „Learning to Live with a 
Difficult Neighbour‟ and „Towards an Adult Relationship‟: Tweedie, Trading Partners, pp.141-200. 
  
14
 Goldsworthy ed., Facing North, p.372. 
 
15
 Neville Meaney, Towards a New Vision: Australia and Japan: Through 100 Years (East Roseville: 
Kangaroo Press, 1999), pp.115-117. 
 
16
 Neville Meaney, 'The End of "White Australia" and Australia's Changing Perceptions of Asia, 
1945-1990' Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 2 (1995), pp 181-185. 
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acknowledged that there were limits to change and, importantly, presented a case for 
how public acceptance was gained.  This thesis seeks to further explore this 
argument by analysing the ways in which the antagonistic and complementary 
images of Japan simultaneously shaped public opinion towards Japan.
17
 
Structurally this thesis is arranged into three chapters. The first chapter will explore 
the public reaction to the 1951 Japanese Treaty of Peace and associated changes, 
such as the admission of war brides and the debate over trade with Japan. This 
chapter will show that whilst in the early years of the 1950s the antagonistic image 
of Japan was unquestionably dominant the foundations of the complementary image 
of Japan were being laid. Changes to the Australia-Japan relationship in these early 
years were only accepted by the public under assurances that they would be limited 
in scope and impact, thus the years mark the beginning of a decade long process of 
incremental change. This process ultimately resulted in the emergence of the 
complementary image of Japan and a major shift in Australian public opinion.  
The second chapter will focus on the years 1953 and 1954 and the significant 
changes they brought to the Australia-Japan relationship. Events of these years, such 
as the increase in the Australia-Japan trade, the arrival of Japan‟s first post-war 
ambassador to Australia and public support of a Japanese baseball tour show that a 
more positive, complementary image of Japan was beginning to grow in Australia. 
Indeed it will be this thesis‟s contention that these years saw the full emergence of 
the complementary image of Japan. However other events, particularly public 
condemnation of a proposal to use Japanese crews in a defence survey of Australian 
                                                          
17
 Keiko Tamura, „Home Away From Home: The Entry of Japanese War Brides into Australia‟, in 
Paul Jones and Vera Mackie eds., Relationships: Japan and Australia, 1870s - 1950s (University of 
Melbourne, 2001), p.246. 
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waters, show that the antagonistic image of Japan remained influential and limits to 
change strong. The years also saw the Government begin to promote a more positive 
view of Japan, one which presented Japan anew to the Australian public and 
presented change to the Australia-Japan relationship as both beneficial and 
unthreatening. 
The third and final chapter of this thesis begins with a discussion of the 1957 
Commerce Agreement, arguing that it should be seen as indicative of the momentum 
that was steadily growing behind change and the complementary image of Japan. 
The chapter will then study a series of trade fairs and art exhibitions that occurred in 
1958, at the same time of the Mark Foys Art and Crafts Exhibition, which show that 
the public was increasingly positive about an expansion of cultural and trade 
contacts with Japan; a nation who‟s rapid modernisation and industrialisation was 
increasingly regarded as beneficial to Australia‟s growth. These events showed that 
although the antagonistic image of Japan, and limits to change, remained strong a 
major shift in how Australians viewed Japan had taken place. The 1950s had seen 
the emergence of a complementary image of Japan which encouraged further change, 
shaped public perceptions of Japan and made possible the many changes that would 
take place in decades ahead. 
In comparison to the majority of existing literature on the Australia-Japan 
relationship in the 1950s this thesis is concerned with tracing the changes in public 
opinion regarding Japan that resulted from the growing influence a new image of 
Japan which presented it as a modern and unthreatening nation. To trace such 
changes this thesis will use a variety of sources written by, and for, the Australian 
public such as newspapers, magazines, records of organisations such as trade unions 
and public opinion polls, specifically the Morgan Gallup Poll. Undoubtedly these 
13 | P a g e  
 
sources cannot fully reveal the complexity of public opinion and it is acknowledged 
that amongst many sections of the Australian public the new image of Japan as an 
industrialised and friendly nation grew much slower than elsewhere. What analysis 
of these sources can do, however, is illuminate the broad shifts in public opinion 
regarding Japan that the decade saw. Shifts that by the end of the decade had, as the 
1951 boycott and 1958 Mark Foys Exhibition demonstrate, resulted in significant 
change in how the Australian public perceived and interacted with Japan.  
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-Chapter One- 
The Legacy of the Past and the Hope for the Future: The 1951 
Treaty of Peace with Japan 
 ‘Men do not mind the rearmament, say, of Britain, for they trust the peaceable 
intentions of the British Government. But they have no such trust for Japan’  
The Adelaide Advertiser 1951
18
 
 
‘Strangely enough, there seems to be a lot in common between Japanese and 
Australian women. They are both hardworking, self-sufficient, possessing an innate 
love for children and their homes’ 
The Sydney Morning Herald 1952
19
 
On September 8
th
 1951 Australia and eight other nations signed the Treaty of Peace 
with Japan, and officially brought an end to World War Two. In light of Australia‟s 
wartime experience, and long standing fears of Japan, the Treaty was fiercely 
debated within the Australian public sphere, and strong opposition, which stemmed 
from the dominance of the antagonistic image of Japan, was expressed over the 
Treaty‟s allowances for Japanese rearmament. Whilst this opposition never entirely 
disappeared from the debate it was, by the time the Treaty entered force in April 
1952, gradually accompanied by a mood of begrudging acceptance. Whilst a variety 
of reasons gave rise to this mood it will be argued that Government explanations 
were absolutely crucial to its emergence. The Peace Treaty debate thus 
                                                          
18
 The Advertiser, 21 February 1951. 
 
19
The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 1952. 
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foreshadowed the important role Government would play in the promotion of the 
complementary image of Japan. Rearmament was the principal, and most 
controversial, subject of debate concerning Japan in these early years; however the 
admission of war brides and the expansion of the Australia-Japan trade were also 
sensitive topics. Surprisingly public opinion was in favour of these changes however 
it remained adamant that limits on such change must be imposed. The debate over 
the Peace Treaty and associated changes to the Australia-Japan relationship thus 
marked the beginning of a decade-long process of incremental change that 
ultimately would see a substantially more positive image of Japan come to exert 
major influence over public opinion. 
Trepidation and Leadership: The Australian Government Response to the 
Peace Treaty 
Japan‟s military conquests throughout South East Asia in World War Two, and 
especially the bombing of Darwin, had reinforced the legitimacy of Australia‟s fears 
of Japan and left an undeniable scar on the public consciousness. This legacy made 
the public, and Government, particularly concerned about any perceived revival in 
Japanese military might. As the Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, rather 
bluntly declared, it was „asking too much of us to believe that the forces of 
militarism in Japan are completely dead‟.20 The result was that in 1951 the 
Australian Government and public remained adamant that if Japan was to rearm, it 
would be with strict limits. Thus from the beginning of treaty negotiations the 
Government petitioned for „explicit restrictions on Japanese rearmament, especially 
                                                          
20
 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1951. 
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naval construction and rearmament‟.21 However, as Treaty negotiations wore on it 
became obvious to the Australian Government that the United States, increasingly 
fearful of communism, intended to fully rearm Japan. 
The Australian Government itself had long seen communism as a menace to 
Australia, declaring in 1950 that communism was „the present military threat to the 
pacific‟.22 However this fear of communism sat alongside the older more ingrained 
fear of Japan rather than supplanting it. Consequently Australia was faced with a 
dilemma. The U.S argued Japan must be rearmed to fight against communism, yet to 
Australia this rearmament was a direct threat of the same magnitude as that of 
communism.
23
 Under significant international pressure, and aware that the Treaty 
would be ratified with or without them, the Australian Government ultimately 
accepted U.S reasoning and Japanese rearmament.
24
 Aware that public opinion 
remained vigorously opposed to the Peace Treaty the Government immediately 
embarked on a campaign to explain why the Treaty should be accepted.  Upon 
introducing the Treaty into Parliament Richard Casey, Percy Spender‟s successor as 
Minister for External Affairs, declared that the Treaty aimed to prevent „a 
defenceless and economically prostrate [Japan] that will present an easy prey to 
communism‟ from emerging.25  Prime Minister Robert Menzies also weighed in on 
                                                          
21
 „Views of Australian Government Given to Mr Dulles 6th March 1951 (US Head Of Negotiations)‟, 
A5954, 1682/12, NAA. 
 
22
 „Appendix A - Peace Treaty with Japan – Defence Aspects (Paper by Australian Defence 
Committee 27
th
 April 1950)‟, A5954, 1682/12, NAA. 
 
23
 N. D. Harper, „Australia, Japan, and Korea‟ , Far Eastern Survey, 20, no. 8 (April, 1951), p.70. 
 
24
 Neville Meaney, „Japan and Australia‟s Foreign Policy, 1945-1952‟, The Suntory and Toyota 
International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines(March 2000), Discussion paper no. 
IS/00/384, p.77. 
 
25
 Richard Casey, „House of Representatives‟, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (13 July 
1951). 
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the debate, and declared in 1951 that „Australia's position in the free world depends 
on Japan and West Germany not going behind the Iron Curtain.‟26 The Government 
thus moved to position the Treaty, in the eyes of the public, as a necessary change 
due to the threat of communism, and in doing so aimed to gain public acceptance of 
the Treaty. Such leadership would be invaluable in changing public opinion 
regarding the Peace Treaty. 
Regardless of the Treaty‟s necessity the Government, and public, remained 
concerned and felt that limits to Japanese rearmament must be imposed. These limits 
came in the form of the September 1
st
 signing of the ANZUS Pact by the U.S, 
Australia and New Zealand, an Agreement which stipulated in the event of an armed 
attack in the Pacific area on any signatory the three nations would „consult together‟ 
to decide a coordinated response.
27
 Whilst for the United States ANZUS was a 
valuable way in which its influence could be extended into the Pacific, for Australia 
ANZUS was perceived first and foremost as a guarantee for American aid in the 
event of a revival in Japanese militarism.
28
 Whilst the close signing of the Treaty 
and the ANZUS Pact signified the intimate relationship between the two, the 
Australian Government moved to render such a connection explicit through its 
statements on the Pact. As Percy Spender declared following negotiations for 
ANZUS, it was a „safeguard‟ against the rearmed Japan that the Treaty enabled.29 
                                                          
26
 The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 1951. 
 
27
 Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America  - ANZUS 
(Signed 1
st
 September 1951, Entry into Force 29
th
 April 1952). accessed online at the Australasian 
Legal Information Institute (AustLii), < http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1952/2.html>, 
viewed 12/9/2011. 
 
28
 David McLean, „ANZUS Origins: A Reassessment, Australian Historical Studies, 24 (April 1990), 
p.5. 
 
29
 Percy Spender, „House of Representatives‟, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (14 March 
1951). 
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Richard Casey continued this approach, and stated that ANZUS protected Australia 
against „renewed Japanese aggression‟ and „any other country‟ that threatened 
Australian security.
30
 ANZUS was thus viewed by the Government, and presented to 
the public, as a crucial safeguard against a feared post-treaty revival of Japan. It was, 
as historian Hiroyuki Umetsu has noted, another in a long line of agreements 
designed „to protect Australia from Asia‟.31 The need for such safeguards show the 
significant influence the antagonistic image of Japan continued to exert over 
Government and public opinion. Such influence would continue throughout the 
decade to demand change to the Australia-Japan relationship be limited in nature 
and scope. 
Fear and Suspicion: Initial Public Response to the Peace Treaty 
The public response to the Peace Treaty was exceptionally strong, as individuals 
voiced their disapproval through established advocacy groups, such as trade unions, 
and newly founded anti-Treaty groups that ranged from the nationwide „Society for 
the Non Ratification of Japanese Peace Treaty‟ to the more geographically confined 
„North Shore Committee Against the Japanese Peace Treaty‟ . A Gallup Poll 
conducted in August 1951 showed this widespread disapproval with 62.5% of those 
surveyed against the treaty and a mere 21.4% in favour of the Treaty.
32
 Particularly 
virulent in their opposition were the newly formed anti-Japanese rearmament groups 
such as the „Society Opposed to the Ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty‟ who 
saw the treaty as placing „on a war footing the only Asian power capable of a 
                                                          
30
 Richard Casey, „House of Representatives‟, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (21 June 
1951). 
 
31
 Hiroyuki Umetsu, „From ANZUS to SEATO-A Study of Australian Foreign Policy, 1950-54‟, PhD 
Thesis, the University of Sydney (June 1996), p.10. 
 
32
 Australian Public Opinion Polls, Morgan Gallup Poll, no.788-790 (August-September 1951). 
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seaborne or airborne invasion of Australia‟.33 The Treaty was vehemently opposed 
by the Labor opposition whose leader, H.V. Evatt, declared the Treaty „menaces the 
physical and economic safety of the peoples of the South Pacific‟.34 Trade Unions 
rallied behind Evatt with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (A.C.T.U) going 
so far as to telegram U.S President Truman and the Australian Government to 
communicate its belief that rearming Japan was a mistake and would result in Japan 
again becoming „an aggressor nation‟35. The A.C.T.U also passed a motion at its 
national congress which declared that „The remilitarisation of Japan would be a 
constant menace to the security of Australia‟.36 The Prime Minister‟s office received 
a deluge of individual protest letters from a variety of citizens that testified to the 
strength of wartime memories, illustrated by one housewife‟s letter in which she 
declared that the spectre of a rearmed Japan meant „I couldn‟t tuck my children in 
bed safe this night‟. 37 The emotive nature of this plea demonstrated how deeply 
ingrained fears of Japan were amongst members of the Australian public, as well as 
the huge influence that the antagonistic image of Japan, bolstered by wartime 
experience, exerted upon public opinion. These influences and fears consequently 
made the public intensely suspicious of any change to the Australia-Japan 
relationship, especially where war was concerned. If change was to occur in the 
                                                          
33
 „Letter to Prime Minister Menzies from the The Society Opposed to the Ratification of the 
Japanese Peace Treaty 4
th
 February 1952‟, A462, 619/1/3, NAA. 
 
34
 Dr. Herbert Evatt, „House of Representatives‟, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (21 
February 1952). 
 
35
 „Telegram 3rd September 1951‟, A462 619/1/3, NAA. 
 
36
 A.C.T.U National Congress, Decisions of the All Australian Trade Union Congress: September 3-7 
1951 (Melbourne: Industrial Printing and Publicity, 1951), Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian 
National University, S784, box 1. 
 
37
 „Letter to Prime Minister Menzies, signed Mrs L Hall 1st September 1951‟, A462, 619/1/3, NAA. 
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Australia-Japan relationship, and the complementary image of Japan emerge, it 
evidently had to do so within the strict limits that resulted from such suspicion.  
Australian newspapers throughout the 1950s regularly discussed the issue of 
Australian-Japan relations and thus offer a valuable, and exceptionally vivid, source 
of public opinion regarding the Japanese Peace Treaty. Newspaper responses, like 
individual and group protests, condemned Japanese rearmament and showed the 
huge impact the antagonistic image of Japan exerted upon Australians. This sense of 
fear and distrust is captured at its most extreme by the Darwin‟s Northern Standard 
which declared that the Japanese could not be trusted to rearm as they represented „a 
barbaric, inhuman race‟.38 Whilst not nearly as bombastic as this, most Australian 
newspapers largely agreed with the anti-Japanese sentiment expressed by the 
Northern Standard. Brisbane‟s The Courier Mail, for example, declared that the 
treaty provoked „grave doubt in many minds‟, and published letters from citizens 
which argued that rearmament was a great „danger to our country‟.39  Editorials in 
southern city papers such as Sydney‟s The Sydney Morning Herald, Adelaide‟s The 
Advertiser and Hobart‟s The Mercury, although less extreme, expressed the same 
distrust of Japanese rearmament with Melbourne‟s The Age stating that „No peace 
treaty with Japan ought be acceptable to an Australian Government unless it 
embraces assurances that, firstly, any rearmament of the former enemy is strictly 
limited‟.40  Whilst newspapers varied in their level of opposition, with rural 
newspapers and those of Queensland the most extreme, they all showed an intense 
suspicion of the Japanese and a belief that a rearmed Japan would inevitably 
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threaten Australia. The strong opposition of Queensland and Northern Territory 
newspapers was undoubtedly the legacy that decades of fears concerning Japanese 
movements in Australia‟s north had left. Indeed as Megumi Kato has noted the most 
common representation of Japanese activity in Australia‟s north for much of the 
early twentieth century was as a prelude to invasion.
41
 Experience of the northern 
states during the war, especially Darwin who had been bombed in 1942, only 
appeared to strengthen the validity of such fears. This legacy of „bitter wartime 
hatred‟ and the strong influence of the antagonistic image of Japan consequently led 
to strong public opposition to the Peace Treaty, opposition that would remain strong 
throughout the Peace Treaty debate.
42
 
Begrudging Acceptance: Changes in Public Response to the Peace Treaty 
Whilst this opposition remained strong throughout the Peace Treaty debate, a change 
in public opinion occurred from late 1951, which was brought about by the influence 
of Government explanations and the presence of limits to change, such as the 
ANZUS Pact. The signing of ANZUS was supported by both sides of politics and 
the majority of the public with a Gallup Poll showing 50% of Australians support 
the Pact with only 18% opposing. Furthermore the poll returned the results of 44% 
seeing ANZUS as a credible safeguard against Japanese rearmament, with 39% 
opposed.
43
 Whilst the poll illustrated that overwhelmingly Australians remained 
cautious about Japan, it also indicated that the Peace Treaty and the ANZUS Pact 
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were thought of as connected, so much so that ANZUS had a tangible impact upon 
responses to the Treaty. Newspapers were united in their support of the ANZUS 
Pact, as shown by The Courier Mail who simply thanked the United States and 
Perth‟s The West Australian who regarded the Pact as „an indispensable complement 
of the Japanese treaty‟.44 This sentiment was shared by the Australian Women’s 
Weekly who supported the pact but also maintained that Australians „cannot feel 
secure‟ with a rearmed Japan so close, clearly the antagonistic image of Japan 
remained strong.
45
  Such statements were echoed by The Sydney Morning Herald 
and The Age which declared „Our own dislike of the treaty is greatly abated, if not 
wholly removed, by the Pacific Security Pact‟.46 Regional papers largely agreed. 
Broken Hill‟s The Barrier Miner, for example, held that the only reason Australians 
would accept the treaty was „because the dangers will be offset by a pact of mutual 
assistance with the United States‟.47 The Townsville Bulletin struck on a similar note 
and The Launceston Examiner, like its Broken Hill brethren, saw the Pact as going 
„a long way toward meeting Australian and New Zealand objections to unlimited 
Japanese rearmament‟.48 Support for the Pact also came from community 
organisations such as the R.S.S & A.I.L.A whose NSW State President, Mr. W. Yeo, 
saw it as a much needed safeguard against a rearmed Japan.
49
 Whilst the 
antagonistic image of Japan made the Australian public opposed to the very concept 
of a rearmed Japan, it is also clear that by 1952 the public was coming to 
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begrudgingly accept the Treaty and its provisions, however distasteful they may be. 
Such acceptance was undoubtedly due to the Governments positioning the ANZUS 
Pact as a constraint on the threat of a rearmed Japan; for the ever wary Australian 
public ANZUS provided comfort akin to a security blanket.
50
 
Whilst the perceived limitations that the ANZUS imposed on a rearmed Japan were 
central to gaining public acceptance of the Peace Treaty, the Government‟s 
explanation of the Treaty‟s necessity in the face of the communist threat was also a 
significant factor in changing public opinion. For several months a heated campaign 
had been fought over the Government‟s proposed referendum to ban the Communist 
Party, indeed the referendum took place a mere two weeks after the Peace Treaty 
was signed. Thus at the time of the Peace Treaty debate the Australian public was 
acutely sensitive to the prospect of a communist threat, indeed communism was the 
most contentious and divisive political issue of 1951.
51
 Whilst communism would 
remain a significant influence on how the public viewed Japan throughout the 
decade it would never be as a strong and explicit shaper of opinion as it was in 1951 
and 1952.This sensitivity was captured by an August 1951 Gallup Poll which 
showed nine out of ten Australians believed that Russia was uncommitted to world 
peace.
52
 Government explanations of the Treaty‟s necessity due to the Communist 
threat thus gained support from substantial sections of the public such as the R.S.S 
& A.I.L.A  whose NSW State President Mr. W. Yeo succinctly declared „we could 
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not allow the communists to control the Japanese Islands‟.53 From late 1951 
onwards newspapers, such as The Age, The Canberra Times and The Sydney 
Morning Herald, also spoke of the treaty as having „no alternative‟ due to „Russia‟s 
proselytising and expansionism‟.54 The Launceston Examiner and the Adelaide‟s 
The News similarly called on Australians to „take a realistic view‟ of the treaty in 
light of the communist threat.
55
 Two letters to The Launceston Examiner in 1952 
sparked a heated debate amongst readers with their disapproval of the Treaty 
rejected by numerous responding letters, all of which held the Treaty to have „no 
alternative‟ considering the immediate threat of communism.56 These letters showed 
the significant influence that Government explanations had exerted over public 
opinion, with the ANZUS Pact and communism featuring strongly in public 
responses to the Treaty. The letters also illustrated that as April 1952 grew closer a 
mood of begrudging acceptance increasingly dominated public opinion regarding 
the Peace Treaty. Whilst the antagonistic image of Japan remained strong and a 
major influence on public opinion regarding Japan, the Peace Treaty debate 
demonstrated that this image did not completely rule out change, but rather imposed 
firm limits as to its scope and nature.  
In February 1952 a protest group of individual Australians and trade union 
representatives travelled to Canberra to present a petition to Prime Minister Menzies 
to reject the Peace Treaty. Whilst ultimately unsuccessful the protest showed the key 
features of the Peace Treaty debate such as Government leadership and the strength 
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of an antagonistic image of Japan. Upon receiving the protest group Menzies again 
put forth the Government‟s reasons for acceptance, stating that ANZUS and U.S 
strength would ensure the danger posed by Japan remained limited whilst the threat 
of communism made the Peace Treaty a necessary evil. In a testament to the 
influence these explanations had, in the preceding months, exerted upon public 
opinion The Barrier Miner, once a major opponent of the Treaty, agreed with 
Menzies and pointed out the „naiveté of the petition‟.57 Other newspapers also ran 
accounts of the protest and paid particular attention to Menzies comments about the 
Treaty‟s necessity in the face of the communist threat.58 These responses showed the 
important influence Government leadership could, and did, exert on public opinion 
and thus foreshadow the central role Government would play in the promotion of the 
complementary image of Japan from 1953 onwards. The protest also showed that 
the antagonistic image of Japan remained a major influence on public opinion and in 
1951 its dominance was largely uncontested; even Menzies was reported to have 
stated that no one „liked‟ the Japanese.59  Writing in 1957 historian and foreign 
affairs commentator Gordon Greenwood noted that whilst ANZUS had allayed the 
public‟s fears of Japan it did not remove them, or the influence they exerted.60 
However it is undeniable that by allaying such fears and gaining public acceptance 
of the Peace Treaty a process of incremental change was begun and the foundations 
for the complementary image of Japan were laid.  
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Goods and People: Public Opinion on Japanese Immigration and Trade 
Whilst rearmament was the principal focus of debate over the Peace Treaty other 
issues attracted considerable attention and controversy, particularly the sensitive 
topics of Japanese immigration and increased imports of Japanese goods. The debate 
over these issues was particularly prominent following the Government‟s decision in 
1951 to allow certain Japanese imports into Australia and the 1952 decision to admit 
Japanese war brides. Interestingly public opinion was largely positive to both 
decisions. Whilst fears of Japanese immigration and the threat Japanese trade posed 
to Australian jobs lay at the heart of the antagonistic image of Japan, these changes 
fell into the range of what the public would accept due to their appearance as limited 
and unthreatening; the war brides promised to come in small numbers and 
assimilate, whilst trade was to remain strictly regulated. The need, first articulated in 
the Peace Treaty debate, to keep Japan from turning towards communism also 
undoubtedly played a factor in public support for the changes. Although these 
changes were limited they must also be understood in their proper context. Australia 
in the 1950s remained firmly committed to maintaining its „White Australia‟ 
immigration policy and protecting jobs, indeed a bipartisan consensus on these 
points existed within Australia.
61
 Thus whilst public acceptance of change was only 
given under the condition that these changes would be limited they remained a 
significant step forward for the Australia-Japan relationship. As these changes 
proved successful, momentum for further change also began to build as the 
Australian public found its fears remained unrealised. As historian Keiko Tamura 
has noted the successful integration of the war brides into Australian society played 
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a significant role in breaking down misconceptions about the Japanese.
62
 Similarly 
the success of imports helped break down fears that Japanese goods would swamp 
the Australian market. These events thus marked the beginning of the emergence of 
the complementary image of Japan by showing the Australian public that Japan did 
not always threaten, but conversely could offer substantial benefits to Australians 
and their ordinary lives.  
The Benefits of Trade: Public Acceptance of Change in the Australia-Japan 
Trading Relationship 
Trade with Japan grew prodigiously throughout the 1950s and played a crucial role 
in triggering a significant shift in public opinion regarding Japan, a role that was 
foreshadowed by the 1951 debate over Japanese trade. Fears of Japan‟s trading 
power lay at the heart of the antagonistic image of Japan and consequently public 
opinion was intensely suspicious of rumours that the Treaty would see an expansion 
in trade, fearing it would damage Australian jobs and living standards. The 
Government moved quickly to quash such rumours and assert its control over the 
situation. The Minister for Trade and Customs, Niel O‟Sullivan, showed such 
leadership when he declared, days after the Peace Treaty‟s signing, that „We [The 
Government] have the power to stop the flooding of home markets with imported 
goods‟.63 However, memories of when cheap Japanese goods actually had  flooded 
the markets in the 1930s and threatened the future of Australian industries made 
such fears difficult to dislodge, as demonstrated by the Australian Financial Review 
when it ominously noted a revival of industries in Japan that had „successfully 
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flooded world markets before the war‟.64 The influence of the antagonistic image of 
Japan was further bolstered by both wartime memories and Australia‟s own 
economic difficulties of the post-war years which made the public acutely sensitive 
to any threat to Australian jobs.
65
 Thus The Sydney Morning Herald and The West 
Australian declared that Japanese imports could lead to a breakdown of „working 
and living conditions‟ and called for strict limitations.66 The Townsville Daily 
Bulletin also demonstrated the strength of the antagonistic image of Japan declaring 
that the Peace Treaty would herald the start of Japans „Trade War‟, a sentiment The 
Courier Mail echoed when it described a „flood of Japanese trade circulars‟ in 
Brisbane and demanded Japanese imports be heavily restricted.
67
 Again 
demonstrating Darwin‟s strong dislike of Japan the Northern Standard went a step 
further and declared that if Darwin businesses attempted to bring Japanese goods, or 
labour, to Australia they „will have no alternative but to change their minds or get 
out of Darwin‟.68 These reactions once again showed the dominance of an 
antagonistic image of Japan, with rumours of Japanese imports reviving long held 
fears of Japan‟s threat to Australia and consequently being staunchly opposed by the 
public. Such reactions demonstrated that changes to the Australia-Japan relationship 
would have to be incremental in scope and pace if public support was to be ensured. 
Whilst the complementary image of Japan had not yet become a major influence 
over public opinion in 1951 it was slowly beginning to emerge, as demonstrated by 
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the public debate over the Australia-Japan trade. During the Peace Treaty debate 
Japan‟s value as a purchaser of Australian wool had often been remarked upon with 
many, especially the Australian Financial Review, which expressed fears that unless 
the trade imbalance between Australia and Japan was rectified disaster loomed.
69
 
Indeed as historian Neville Meaney has convincingly argued, this fear that Japan 
would cease purchases of Australian goods, with disastrous consequences for the 
Australian economy, would remain strong well into the 1970s.
70
 Australia was also 
under significant pressure from its international allies who feared that without an 
expansion in trade Japan may turn to the communist nations to buy its goods; an 
event the Australian government agreed must be prevented at all costs.
71
 
Consequently the Government moved in 1951 to allow some Japanese goods, 
notably a significant number of Japanese toys, into Australia as an attempt to correct 
the trade imbalance.  The public largely understood and accepted the decision along 
with Government assurances that the imports would be limited. Indeed a Gallup Poll 
on the issue revealed 52.2% were in favour of accepting a LIMITED (Emphasis of 
the Poll) number of toys.
72
 However, many sections of the public, such as toy 
manufacturers, were less sure and their reaction again showed the strength of the 
antagonistic image of Japan. The Australian Chambers of Manufacturers (A.C.M) 
protested against the imports whilst toy manufacturers and retailers began an intense 
campaign against the imports, printing a pamphlet fronted by a photo of emaciated 
POWs captioned „Have you forgotten? Ban Jap Toys‟ (Fig.1).73 However the 
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campaign backfired badly and was cancelled after the R.S.S & A.I.L.A labelled it 
„Vile Propaganda‟ whilst the wider community, shown in several newspaper letters, 
also rejected the campaign as nothing more than a „hate campaign‟.74 Other 
newspapers condemned the pamphlet campaign with The Advertiser and The Argus 
condemning the revival of wartime „passions‟ for such a purpose.75 Alongside 
rejecting the pamphlet campaign many commentators argued that the toy imports 
were unthreatening and beneficial to Australian‟s and thus should be accepted. As 
two commentators noted „Australian mothers and fathers‟ were positive about the 
toys and „will be glad to buy them‟.76 The Barrier Miner agreed and declared buying 
Japanese imports was a „matter for each person to decide‟.77 The debate over the 
toys thus shows that limited change would be accepted by the public and, moreover, 
that there was a growing view within the public that certain interactions with Japan, 
such as trade, could be beneficial to Australia; the beginnings of a new, more 
positive, complementary image of Japan were emerging.  
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Defending ‘White Australia’: Public Opposition to Japanese Immigration 
Whilst fears of Japan‟s economic strength had long been part of the antagonistic 
image associated with Japan by Australians it was not the most powerful fear; the 
dubious honour of this title instead belonged to the issue of Japanese immigration. 
One of the principal ways in which Japan appeared as a threat to Australia was a 
belief that it sought to move south and populate Australia. Indeed the White 
Australia Policy, whilst targeting all non-European migrants, was something of a 
„shield forged‟ against the specific threat of Japanese immigration.78 Whilst 
explicitly racial explanations for the policy had fallen out of favour by the 1950s 
there remained a strong cultural explanation for its maintenance. It was argued by 
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Fig.1 Front cover of the pamphlet toy manufacturers and retailers published in 
1951 opposing Japanese toy imports. It reads „Ban Jap Toys: Have you 
Forgotten?‟. 
The Courier Mail, 31 August 
1951. 
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many in Australia that Asian and Australian peoples were culturally incompatible, 
and that if immigration was allowed social cohesion would be lost.
79
 Combined with 
the bitter legacy of war this made public opinion in the early 1950s extremely hostile 
to Japanese immigration, as demonstrated by The Sydney Morning Herald who 
feared that the Peace Treaty would see the Japanese walk upon „the bloody road‟ 
towards Australia they had just been driven back from.
80
 Similarly Sydney‟s The 
Daily Telegraph argued Australia and New Zealand acted out of experience in their 
anti-Japanese immigration policies, after all „The yellow tide had lapped at their 
shores before‟.81 The R.S.S & A.I.L.A continued to back the policy and attacked the 
Government in 1952 for what it believed were attempts to „water down the White 
Australia policy‟; cultural unity must be preserved.82 Clearly public opinion, shaped 
by the antagonistic image of Japan and wartime experiences, was convinced that if 
Japanese immigration was permitted it would not only damage Australia‟s living 
standard but the very cohesion of society itself. 
The Importance of Women and Complementarity: Public Acceptance of the 
Japanese War Brides 
In the face of such opposition it seems surprising, miraculous even, that public 
opinion strongly supported the Government decision of 1952 to allow the entry into 
Australia of Japanese war brides,  a move that has been called a „chip, albeit a tiny 
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one, in the White Australia policy‟.83 Although negative opinions concerning the 
brides did exist, such as one contributor to The Cairns Post who declared „We do 
not want Eurasian Children to mix with our children‟ and a Woman’s Day writer 
who expressed „disgust‟ at the decision, they were largely outweighed by positive 
reactions.
84
 Indeed, a Gallup Poll in March 1952, the same month the policy change 
was announced, showed 60% of surveyed Australians supported the brides.
85
 In 
response to negative opinions voiced within their pages the Australian Women’s 
Weekly and Women’s Day both supported the brides immigration and argued that 
„the numbers [of marriages] are very few‟ and that the brides „devotion and struggle‟ 
showed they posed no threat to Australians.
86
 Other newspapers, notably regional 
newspapers such as The Townsville Bulletin and The Barrier Miner, also supported 
the brides, whilst The Courier Mail found 8/10 Brisbane residents supportive.
87
 The 
acceptance of the brides thus simultaneously asserted the limits to change, which 
resulted from the influence of the antagonistic image of Japan, and marked the 
beginning of a decade-long process of incremental change.  
Whilst public opinion supported the entry of the war brides it was not given 
unconditionally, and was instead dependent on the brides being perceived as 
unthreatening, and the change they would bring as being limited. Central to this 
perception was the ways in which the brides were presented to the Australian public. 
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Beginning with the first war bride, Cherry Parker, and her long yet successful fight 
for acceptance newspapers placed a strong emphasis on the war brides‟ ability to 
assimilate. The Advertiser and The West Australian captured this focus particularly 
well through their favourable commentary on the brides‟ western dress and desire to 
adopt Australian culture whilst leaving their own behind. As The West Australian 
noted, the brides were eagerly adopting „the Australian way‟.88 These stories of easy 
assimilation were often false,  the brides constantly faced a struggle against blatant 
racism and the difficulties of learning a new language and culture, however they 
were crucial to garnering public acceptance of the brides due to the strong focus at 
the time on the ability of „new Australians‟ to assimilate.89 The brides‟ ability to 
assimilate was bolstered by their identity as family based women. Whilst reality 
often fell short of expectations the image of the ideal Australian wife in the 1950s 
was one of dedication to the home environment and family.
90
 The brides‟ stories 
were tales of love, dedication and family and thus they were easily ascribed a role 
within Australian society as Australian housewives. Consequently the brides were 
seen by the Australian public as an affirmation of the ideal of Australian 
womanhood, not a threat to it. As The Sydney Morning Herald declared, the brides 
had „a lot in common with Australian women‟.91 Indeed photographs of the brides 
deliberately focused on their identity as housewives and as mothers, whilst also 
paying attention to their western appearance that demonstrated their desire to 
assimilate (Fig.2). It should also be noted that this representation of Japanese 
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women as unthreatening had far deeper roots than the war brides; indeed, since 
before Federation Japanese women were usually presented in Australia as docile and 
alluring. It was men who were the symbol of the antagonistic image of Japan, an 
association deepened by war.
92
 This public support of the war brides showed that the 
antagonistic image of Japan did not prohibit change, but rather demanded that such 
change be strictly limited. However the impact of the brides, along with other 
changes, extended beyond such limits as the change they brought helped to pave the 
way for the emergence of the complementary image of Japan and, subsequently, a 
major shift in public opinion regarding Japan. Writing in 1965, Isabel Carter noted 
that the brides were for many Australians the first Japanese person they had met and 
happily noted the positive impression they made.
93
 Beyond personal contact the 
successful assimilation of the war brides demonstrated to the public that change to 
the Australia-Japan relationship did not necessarily threaten, but rather could 
complement Australian society and values.  
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The Foundations Laid: Public Response to the Japanese Peace Treaty 1951-
1952 
Historian Alan Rix has argued that the Peace Treaty was important as it marked the 
„point from which Australian policy could not retreat; it had eventually to come to 
terms with Japan‟.94 This thesis agrees wholeheartedly with this view and argues 
that the Peace Treaty, and associated changes, marked the beginning of a process of 
incremental change and the emergence of the complementary image of Japan. The 
issues of Japanese rearmament, the admission of war brides and expansion of trade 
showed the important impact Government leadership could exert over public 
opinion and also demonstrated that change could occur as long as it was perceived 
as limited in nature and scope. By adhering to such limits these changes proved to 
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Fig.2 A picture of Cherry Parker, Australia‟s first Japanese War Bride.  Note her 
identification as a housewife and her western appearance. 
The Courier Mail, 5 July 1952. 
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the Australian public that Japan did not necessarily always threaten but rather could 
enhance its future economic and even cultural, development. Whilst it is undeniable 
that the antagonistic image of Japan remained dominant during these years it is 
equally undeniable that a process of change in public opinion regarding Japan had 
begun. This process would gain pace in the following years and result in the 
emergence of a new image of Japan, one which would exert significant influence 
over public opinion regarding Japan. 
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-Chapter Two- 
Steps and Stumbles: Changes in Public Opinion Towards Japan, 
1953-1954 
‘The happiness of the future depends upon the future, and not upon nursing the 
bitterness of the past’  
Prime Minister Robert Menzies, 1954
95
 
 
‘What ARE we going to do about Japan, and the Japanese? Are we going to hate 
them forever, or are we going to receive them back into our company as a civilised 
people?’  
The Argus, 1954
96
 
 
The years 1953 and 1954 saw the complementary image of Japan fully bloom and 
begin to exert considerable influence upon public opinion, a turn of events that was 
to a large extent the result of Government leadership. As a result, public opinion of 
Japan was increasingly shaped by two quite different images. The influence of these 
two images was shown by the positive reception given to Japan‟s first post-war 
ambassador to Australia, Mr. Haruhiko Nishi, and the subsequent vigorous public 
condemnation of his comments concerning possible Japanese immigration to 
Australia. Similarly, the steady expansion of trade with Japan between 1953 and 
1954 was largely well received by the public, although limitations remained crucial 
even in this most beneficial of developments. The continuing strength of public 
suspicion and fear of Japan was rendered explicit by the public furore surrounding 
the 1954 proposal by the United States to use Japanese crews to survey Australian 
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waters; the survey proposal exceeded the limits to change, revived decade old fears 
of Japanese immigration and consequently was opposed by the public. Yet by 
December 1954, when a Japanese baseball team visited Australia, it was evident that 
Australian public opinion regarding Japan was slowly growing more positive under 
the influence of a recently emergent, and Government endorsed, beneficial image of 
Japan; a trend that would continue throughout the remaining years of the 1950s. 
Renewing Contacts: The 1953 Public Response to the Arrival of the Japanese 
Ambassador  
Eight months after the Peace Treaty came into effect Mr. Haruhiko Nishi stepped off 
a plane in Canberra to take up his position as Japanese Ambassador to Australia. On 
arrival he was greeted by members of the press who reported positively on the event, 
as demonstrated by The Courier Mail’s declaration that Mr. Nishi‟s arrival was an 
attempt at friendship that Australia „should not deny these former enemies‟.97 The 
Sydney Morning Herald and The Canberra Times similarly expressed a hope that, 
over time, „it may become possible for Australians in the future to re-establish 
friendly associations with a Japan‟.98 The sentiment was echoed by Richard Casey, 
Minister for External Affairs, who hoped that Ambassador Nishi would assist in 
fostering friendship and expressed a hope that relations „between the two countries 
will continue to improve‟.99 Whilst wartime experiences, and the older fears of 
Japan, had not yet disappeared the dominant view of the Ambassador‟s arrival was 
that it was a necessary and positive step forward for the two nations.
100
 Even 
Darwin‟s the Northern Standard was positive about the Ambassador‟s arrival and 
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looked forward to further trade as a result, although it remained sceptical about 
Japan‟s true intentions.101 This positive response to Ambassador Nishi‟s arrival 
showed that public opinion was not solely shaped by the antagonistic image of 
Japan, and that there was, in fact, an ever growing view that certain changes to the 
Australia-Japan relationship could be mutually beneficial for Australia and Japan. 
Whilst the public response to Ambassador Nishi‟s arrival was largely positive it did 
not come without conditions, and indeed throughout the Ambassador‟s time in 
Australia his activities remained tightly constrained by ongoing public suspicion of 
Japan. The limits to what change the public would accept were made clear when the 
Ambassador was reported to have remarked in April 1953 that Japanese migrants 
could be used to develop Australia‟s north. The public response to the remarks was 
overwhelmingly negative, and showed that if the complementary image of Japan 
was to emerge and grow it would need to do so under the stringent limits imposed 
by the influence of the antagonistic image of Japan. The Canberra Times led the 
charge and harshly rebuked the ambassador in a lengthy editorial where it labelled 
his comments „astonishingly naïve‟ and noted the „intensity of the feeling of this 
country for the maintenance of a white Australia‟.102 The Canberra Times also 
ominously remarked that „There have been hints from time to time that Japanese 
eyes are again on New Guinea‟, in a comment which showed how deeply entrenched 
fears of Japan had become.
103
 The Courier Mail agreed and declared that Australia 
remained opposed to the „immigration of all Asians‟ and helpfully supplied a map to 
allow Australians to understand where the Japanese might settle, although at no 
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point had any areas been specified (Fig.3).
104
 Melbourne‟s The Argus declared that 
the memory of the war remained strong and advised Mr. Nishi „to discuss such ideas 
in private with representative Australians before again publicly expressing them‟; a 
polite, albeit clear, rebuke.
105
 The Mercury agreed and supported the Tasmanian 
R.S.S & A.I.L.A President Mr. N.D. Wilson„s statement that such large scale 
Japanese migration would „never be welcome in Australia‟.106 Rural papers similarly 
rejected the Ambassador‟s remarks, although many remained positive about the 
relationship on the whole with Tasmania‟s The Advocate enthusiastic about the 
development of „friendly trading relations‟ with Japan.107 It should be noted that Mr. 
Nishi denied making such inflammatory comments and wrote publically to The 
Canberra Times to declare that an Australian reporter had asked if Japan could send 
migrants to Australia, to which the ambassador responded „Yes. But, I repeat: if 
invited‟.108  Regardless of the truth of the newspaper reports it is, for this thesis‟s 
purpose, the public response that is most important. The widespread public 
disavowal of Mr. Nishi‟s reported comments show that whilst a new image of Japan, 
as a modern and valuable partner in Australia‟s development, was emerging it 
remained constrained by the dominant antagonistic image of Japan. If public 
acceptance and support was to be gained, change would have to remain incremental 
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and limited. Japanese immigration in 1953, and for many years to come, remained 
well beyond such limits.
109
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Promoting the Complementary Image of Japan: Government Leadership and 
Change to the Australia-Japan Trading Relationship 
One of the most important developments that Ambassador Nishi saw in his tenure as 
Ambassador was the gradual expansion of bilateral trade between Australia and 
Japan from 1953.  Japan‟s value as a trading partner to Australia had skyrocketed 
since 1951 and by 1953 the Japan trade was running at a ratio of 19:1 to Australia‟s 
favour.
110
 This absurdly lopsided trading relationship reached a crisis point in 1953 
when Japan stated publically that unless Australia allowed more Japanese imports it 
would run out of the funds to buy Australian goods. If such an event was to take 
place the results for the Australian economy, which was increasingly dependent on 
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Fig.3 The Front Page story of The Courier Mail in which it discussed Ambassador 
Nishi‟s reported comments  
The Courier Mail, 2 April 1953. 
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Japanese purchases, would have been devastating; consequently the Government 
announced a substantial relaxation in import restrictions in 1953.
111
 The 
Government was also driven by pressure from allies that feared Japan may begin to 
turn to the communist nations unless its trade balance was rectified.
112
 Thus, as 
historians Alan Rix and Sandra Tweedie have argued, 1953 and 1954 represented 
the „crucial period‟ in the Australia-Japan trading relationship that saw the 
foundations laid for future expansions in economic, and cultural, contacts between 
Australia and Japan.
113
 Importantly, these changes also triggered a wider 
Government revaluation of the Japanese relationship and saw the Government begin 
to actively project a new image of Japan as a nation of great benefit for Australia, 
and one which complemented Australia‟s own development. 1953 thus stands as an 
important year for the Australia-Japan relationship as it marked the year in which 
substantial changes occurred and the Government adopted a new approach towards 
Japan, an approach which was regularly and enthusiastically conveyed to the public. 
As in the Peace Treaty debate, the Government moved quickly after deciding to 
expand trade with Japan to explain its reasoning to the public, an attempt to gain 
public acceptance of the changes and make public opinion more receptive to further 
changes. One of the most direct and emotive explanations of the trade changes 
occurred in a September 1953 radio speech delivered by Prime Minister Menzies as 
part of his „Man to Man‟ series. These broadcasts were simulcast around Australia 
and used Menzies‟s famed oratorical skill to talk directly to Australians, usually on 
the more contentious political issues of the day. Menzies opened his speech simply, 
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by declaring that Australia „must allow Japan more trade‟. However, he soon 
expanded and began to position Japan as a nation which benefitted and enhanced, 
rather than threatened, Australia‟s development. Indeed, Menzies even declared if 
Australia was to remain „a great trading nation‟ more Japanese imports were a 
necessity.
114
 The speech represented an important milestone in the development of 
the complementary image as it marks the moment at which the Government began, 
in a coordinated manner, to publically promote it.  As Chem Loyld has noted Prime 
Minister Menzies was an ardent believer in the power of speech to enable 
Governments to lead public opinion.
115
 Such leadership was, according to Menzies, 
one of the principal roles of politicians, indeed in 1947 Menzies had declared in an 
essay that the „art‟ of politics was to „provide exposition, persuasion, and 
inspiration‟.116 Menzies 1953 „Man to Man‟ speech thus showed that the 
Government was beginning to commit itself to a longer term approach to Japan and 
sought to lead public opinion in a more optimistic direction. The effects of such 
political leadership should not be underestimated, indeed as historian James Curran 
has noted, speeches in the post-war era performed a crucial role in „leading the 
people to a new understanding of themselves and their place in the world‟.117 The 
leadership that emerged between 1953 and 1954 similarly helped the Australian 
public come to terms with the major changes the Australia-Japan relationship was 
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undergoing and also played major role in promoting a new image of Japan, an image 
that highlighted the increasingly reciprocal nature of the Australia-Japan 
relationship.  
Menzies was not alone in his statements concerning the Australia-Japan relationship 
and indeed it is a parliamentary speech by the intensely anti-Japanese Alexander 
Downer (Snr) that perhaps best captures the slow, and highly contested, shift in the 
Government‟s approach towards Japan and the influence of the two images of Japan. 
In the very opening sentences of his speech Downer declared „There is probably no 
member of this  chamber who has as good a knowledge or as great a detestation of 
the Japanese as myself‟; a sentiment derived from both Downer‟s wartime 
experience as a Japanese POW and the influence of the antagonistic image of Japan. 
Yet Downer then declared that the Australia-Japan relationship needed to be 
deepened due to its obvious benefits to Australia, he repeated Menzies argument that 
Japan was vital to Australia‟s future and  asserted that if trade restrictions were not 
eased the wool industry, „the foundation of the prosperity of this country‟, would be 
imperilled.
118
 Downer‟s speech demonstrates that whilst the antagonistic image of 
Japan remained strong opinions were now also being shaped by a more positive, and 
increasingly influential, image of Japan.  
Government influence over public opinion was in the 1950s substantially different 
from what it is today. Indeed, historian Judith Brett has argued that the 1950s was 
one of the final eras in which Australians routinely put the national interest ahead of 
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individual interests; it was an era of duties and not of rights.
119
 Consequently 
Government promotion of the complementary image of Japan exerted major 
influence over public opinion. This is not to say that the influence of the antagonistic 
image of Japan disappeared under the weight of Government explanations. Indeed 
groups such as the A.C.M condemned the trade changes as a threat to Australian 
jobs.
120
 Rather, it is this thesis‟s contention that 1953 saw the two images begin to 
simultaneously shape public opinion, the effects of which were demonstrated by 
groups such as the Queensland Woolgrowers who enthusiastically greeted the trade 
changes.
121
 A 1953 Gallup Poll also showed the influence of these two images on 
public opinion with 57% of those questioned supporting imports from Japan „to help 
them pay for our wool‟.122 The clarification is important, although change was 
increasingly accepted by the public the fears associated with the antagonistic image 
of Japan meant that the public remained adamant that limits to change exist.
123
 The 
trade changes of 1953 thus mark the moment at which the process of incremental 
change and the growth of a new image of Japan began to accelerate, although it 
would be many years before the antagonistic image of Japan met its demise.  
The Limits to Change Reasserted: Public Response to the 1954 Defence Survey  
Under an agreement signed in 1947 the United States and Australia had agreed to 
jointly survey, for defence purposes, islands to Australia‟s north and in September 
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1953 the U.S. announced its intent to use expert Japanese surveyors to do so. The 
Australian Government initially accepted the proposal on the proviso that a series of 
conditions to limit the movements and information gained by Japanese surveyors be 
adhered to, conditions that the U.S accepted.
124
 However in late January 1954 news 
of the Survey leaked to the public, the subsequent wave of condemnation shocked 
the United States and forced the Government into retreat; a mere week after the 
story broke the Government rejected the Survey.
125
 This controversy has commonly 
been cited as a demonstration of Australians ongoing suspicion of Japan and 
relegated to a brief sentence in studies of the Australia-Japan relationship, yet this 
labelling does not fully explain the public furore around the Survey.
126
 In actuality, 
the Survey was rejected because it exceeded the limits of change by reviving the age 
old fears concerning Japanese activity in Australia‟s north, such fears would 
continue to be a brake on the development of the Australia-Japan relationship until 
the 1970‟s.127 Thus the Survey controversy should be recognised as a testament to 
the ongoing influence of the antagonistic image of Japan and an assertion of where 
the limits to change laid in 1954, limits that would define the future growth of the 
complementary image of Japan.  
Much of the reason for public condemnation of the 1954 Survey lay in its perceived 
threat to Australia‟s identity as a White British nation, an aspect of Australian 
identity that had long ago been forged in opposition to Japanese migration. At the 
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time of the Survey this identity was being emphatically reasserted due to the 
impending tour of Australia by Queen Elizabeth II, which promoted „the greatest 
outpouring of British race sentiment in the history of Australia‟.128 If Australia‟s 
white British identity was, as Neville Meaney has argued, a „national religion‟, then 
the Survey had shaken the church at the very height of a particularly captivating 
sermon.
129
  Responses from the public showed how strong fears of Japan remained 
with groups such as The Air Force Association declaring that the Survey showed 
that „there is an obvious feeling in Japan that they want New Guinea‟.130 The 
Advertiser, The Mercury, The Argus and The Age argued that the survey presented „a 
danger to Australia‟ and its national security whilst The Canberra Times decried the 
survey for utilising „personnel who would otherwise be ineligible to enter Australia 
under our immigration policy.
 131
  The language of these responses was 
exceptionally vivid, and was highly reminiscent of wartime comments regarding 
Japan. As The Sydney Morning Herald emotively declared, Japan was clearly 
looking south „with covetous eyes‟.132 Indeed, a poll of Melbourne citizens by The 
Argus found nine out of ten opposed the Survey plan. One of those Melbournians 
questioned declared that the Japanese „still have their eyes on Australia‟, whilst 
another commented that „letting them into New Guinea would only be the thin end 
of the wedge of infiltration‟.133 Such responses showed that the Survey revived fears 
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of spying and infiltration that had dominated representations of the Japanese in 
popular culture for decades. The memory of the war was also often invoked, and 
letters to newspapers commonly rejected the survey as „an insult to our dead‟, whilst 
The Australian Workers Union, one of the few unions who publically spoke on the 
controversy due its short duration, agreed and called the Survey a „betrayal‟ of the 
Australian people.
134
 Rural and city newspapers were united in their disapproval 
with The Barrier Miner, who labelled the issue a „political bomb‟ and the 
Rockhampton Daily Bulletin, who declared it a threat to Australia‟s „defence 
line‟.135 Perhaps the best summary of public opinion regarding the Survey came 
from The Cairns Post who declared „trade relations are one thing – permitting the 
Japanese to survey our potential defence areas is quite different‟.136 This public 
response to the survey shows that where changes to the Australia-Japan relationship 
lacked limits and revived fears that lay at the heart of the antagonistic image of 
Japan they would be rejected; the 1954 survey was quite simply too much, too soon. 
Whilst public response to the survey was overwhelmingly negative it was interesting 
that these responses did not disavow the Australia-Japan relationship itself, or 
previous changes. The issue was clearly one of the limits to change, rather than 
change itself. This state of affairs, resulting from the influence of the two images of 
Japan, was neatly encapsulated by a statement made by R.S.S & A.I.L.A Federal 
President Sir George Holland that  his organisation had been „most reasonable in its 
approach to the question of Japanese rearmament, but this move brings too close to 
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our own doors our former enemies‟.137 The survey was decried by the public 
because it was perceived as a threat to fundamental aspects of Australian life, clearly 
if Japan was to approach Australia‟s door it would have to do so slowly.  The 
Courier Mail and The Daily Telegraph also showed this response with both papers 
printing comics portraying the survey as the first step in a Japanese infiltration of 
Australia whilst simultaneously advocating „trade and friendly relations with Japan‟ 
(Fig.4).
138
 Similar opinions are contained in a special page of letters The Mercury 
devoted to the Survey issue. Writers acknowledged the need to move beyond the 
war, with one commentator drawing a parallel between France‟s difficulties coming 
to terms with a Germany‟s revival, whilst another disliked Labor‟s „capitalising on 
the war-time prejudices of the average Australian to win votes‟. However all were 
adamant the Survey be rejected, quite simply, no Japanese „should be permitted to 
survey inside Commonwealth boundaries‟.139 Whilst the tone of the letters was a 
testament to the ongoing influence of the antagonistic image of Japan it was also 
clear that it was the type of change that the Survey represented which was rejected, 
not change to the Australia-Japan relationship itself. Indeed a Gallup Poll taken less 
than a month after the survey affair found 52% of Australian‟s remained in favour of 
increased trade with Japan.
140
 These responses showed that, as Gordon Greenwood 
has noted, the public had not yet reached a consensus on how Japan should be 
approached.
 141
 The 1954 Survey should thus be understood as an event which 
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displays the increasingly complex nature of public opinion regarding Japan, a 
complexity that resulted from the influence of the two images of Japan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In the face of such overwhelming negative public opinion regarding the survey the 
Australian Government was forced to act, calling a special cabinet meeting to decide 
the Government‟s stance. Cabinet notebooks showed the debate was extremely 
heated, and all Ministers acknowledged that the situation was „terribly explosive‟. 
Cabinet on the whole remained supportive of change to the Australia-Japan 
relationship but appears to have felt that, in light of the public reaction and the 
impending election, the Survey was a step too far; as Menzies noted „We have no 
Fig. 4 A cartoon detailing the public response to the 1954 Survey, the depiction of 
Japan is strongly reminiscent of wartime and pre-war cartoons. The Japanese 
figure in the boat, labelled ANZUS, declares „Just making harmless little charts of 
Hon. Northern approaches to your highly esteemed country!‟ 
The Courier Mail, 28 January 1954. 
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time for a campaign of persuasion‟.142 The involvement of the Japanese in the 
Survey „even as members of the crew‟ was thus rejected by cabinet.143 On the whole 
the Survey controversy showed that whilst the complementary image of Japan was 
growing the public remained heavily influenced by the antagonistic image of Japan; 
changing public perceptions of Japan was clearly to be a long and arduous process. 
A Nation to Complement Australia: The 1954 Trade Relaxations and the 
Growth of the Complementary Image of Japan 
The Survey controversy did not spell an end to the process of incremental change in 
the Australia-Japan relationship; on the contrary, the rest of 1954 saw the 
Government increase its promotion of the benefits a closer relationship with Japan 
offered for Australia. Fears of communism again drove the Government to relax 
trade with Japan in early 1954, but so too did Japan‟s own circumstances. By 1954 
the divide in Japan over economic direction had been resolved with a dedication to 
expanding exports, increasing living standards and investing heavily in 
technology.
144
 Thus by 1954 Japan‟s value as a buyer of Australian goods and its 
commitment to a path of development that did not threaten Australia had been 
cemented. Whilst the existence of this path would only become evident to the public 
in years to come it undoubtedly contributed to the Australian Government‟s 
increasing attempts to promote an image of Japan which portrayed it as 
unthreatening and beneficial for Australia‟s own development. 
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One of the most important articulations of this new image of Japan came when 
Prime Minister Menzies delivered another „Man to Man‟ speech in March 1954.  
The speech demonstrated that the antagonistic image of Japan had, by 1954, lost its 
official status and that the Government was committed to fostering public 
acceptance of change. In his speech Menzies declared that although Japan had been 
a „cruel enemy‟ Australia acknowledged that „the greatest stumbling block to peace 
is the perpetuation of enmities‟. Menzies also stated that if trade with Japan ceased 
„our income and standards of living would fall‟. 145 This was a statement of 
significant gravity and demonstrates that the Government had adopted a new image 
of Japan. For decades Japan had been perceived as antagonistic to Australia‟s living 
standards, now it was presented as fuelling their rise. This call for a movement 
beyond the past was similarly advocated by The Minister for Commerce and 
Agriculture, John McEwen, who had declared in early 1954 that the Government 
had ‟no desire to perpetuate an atmosphere of enmity towards the Japanese‟.146 The 
public again proved receptive to the message, as demonstrated by the Legion of Ex 
Servicemen and Ex Servicewomen who declared, rather bluntly, that Australians 
should „bury the hatchet‟.147 The Mercury also accepted Menzies‟s argument and 
asserted that if trade and ties with Japan were not increased, a fall would be seen in 
„national income, and in the living standards of Australians‟.148 The Courier Mail 
was strongly supportive of the Government‟s new position and also noted the 
valuable role Australia could play in keeping Japan out of the „anti-Western 
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Communist bloc‟.149 Regional newspapers, such as The Cairns Post and The 
Advocate, supported Menzies speech and declared maintaining hate of Japan would 
be „injurious in the long run to Australia‟.150 The Australian Chambers of Commerce 
and the Australian Financial Review, long supporters of the Australia-Japan trade, 
applauded the relaxation of restrictions yet asserted that „due precautions‟ were 
indispensible to any expansion; limits to change thus remained strong.
151
 These 
public demands for limitations on change were heard by the Government with the 
Minister for Trade and Customs, Niel O‟Sullivan, again stating that Japan would 
remain one of the most regulated of Australia‟s trading partners.152 The Public 
response to the March 1954 round of trade relaxations showed that the previous 
changes to the Australia-Japan relationship had led to an increasingly strong belief 
that certain changes, if limited, could offer reciprocal benefits Australia and Japan. 
The Acceptance of Change: Public Support for the 1954 Japanese Baseball 
Tour 
As 1954 drew to a close a Japanese baseball team journeyed to Australia to begin 
national tour. This event offered an insight into the distance travelled in the 
relationship since the beginning of the decade and a demonstration of the now 
significant influence of the complementary image of Japan. The tour was also part of 
a new change in the Australia-Japan relationship as sporting contacts between the 
countries dramatically expanded. Australian sportsmen competed in Japan, a 
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Japanese team participated in the Davis Cup and Japan was invited to the 1956 
Melbourne Olympics.
153
 The tour was, however, marred with controversy from its 
outset due to an unwittingly insensitive decision made by tour organisers to 
commence the tour on Armistice Day. Due to this blunder the R.S.S & A.I.L.A, at 
its annual congress, conducted a debate that resulted in a boycott against the tour. 
The NSW State President, Mr. Yeo, vigorously opposed the tour and sensationally 
declared that no Japanese should be allowed into Australia until „the last relatives of 
the nurses and men who were butchered by the Japanese had passed on‟. However 
he was opposed by the Federal President Sir George Holland who, whilst opposing 
the tour beginning on Armistice Day, held that the tour itself should be allowed as a 
positive step beyond the war and one which reflected Japan‟s value as a trading 
partner; after all, Sir George noted, „we have the future generations to think of‟.154 
This debate showed that, for many members of the Australian public, the 
complementary image was exerting considerable influence over their perceptions of 
Japan. Equally, as demonstrated by Mr. Yeo‟s comments, the antagonistic image of 
Japan remained influential over public opinion and continued to demand change be 
limited in nature and scope. 
Prior years of change had shown the Australian public that Japan did not, contrary to 
the view presented by the antagonistic image of Japan, always threaten Australia but 
rather under certain conditions could benefit Australia and its people. The baseball 
tour met these conditions and consequently public opinion was immensely hostile to 
the R.S.S & A.I.L.A boycott. Whilst negative responses to the tour did occur, for 
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example the baseballers were denied entrance to the Brisbane Shrine of 
Remembrance and refused accommodation by some Darwin hotels, the majority of 
public opinion supported the tour. However on a symbolic level Australians widely 
supported the tour as shown by The Sydney Morning Herald, The Argus and The 
Age who argued that whilst the war should never be forgotten the boycott merely 
encouraged „perpetual hatred‟, a new approach should instead be sought out.155 The 
Methodist Church and The Church of England also supported the tour, and declared 
that „sooner or later former enemies have to be included in those who visit us either 
on business or pleasure‟.156 Indeed months prior the Catholic Church had called for a 
new era „of goodwill with Tokyo.157 The Age agreed and declared Australians 
should not attack the young Japanese baseball team that was attempting to redeem 
„the faults of an unpleasant past‟.158 Indeed, the young age of the players often 
received attention, as demonstrated by The Courier Mail who pointed out that their 
youth made them victims, not perpetrators, war. The Courier Mail also noted their 
coach was a Japanese-American soldier with two purple hearts, and as such the 
boycott was not only unjustified but was an insult to an Australian ally.
159
 In its 
report on the Brisbane baseball game The Townsville Daily Bulletin applauded the 
team‟s „world class form‟ and happily noted that the Queensland crowd „gave the 
Japanese a good reception throughout‟.160 Overall public opinion over the baseball 
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tour was positive, and the tour was perceived as unthreatening with its sporting 
nature undoubtedly striking a chord with Australia‟s own love for its „national 
institution‟ of sport.161 Whilst a commercial failure, due to its high ticket prices and 
the small following baseball had in Australia, the positive public response given to 
the tour shows that the increasing influence of a more positive image of Japan had 
resulted in growing public acceptance of change to the Australia-Japan relationship. 
Whilst affirmations of the tour were common the majority of the public response 
was focused on condemning the R.S.S & A.I.L.A. boycott. Such condemnation 
demonstrated that limits were imposed both upon the growth of the complementary 
image of Japan and upon the influence of the antagonistic image of Japan. The 
Barrier Miner attacked the R.S.S & A.I.L.A boycott and declared that it was 
„carrying the matter a stage too far‟ and that Australia must begin to „resume both 
trade and social relations with Japan‟.162 The opinion was shared by one 
commentator who emotively declared the treatment of the baseball team was „one of 
the most disgusting exhibitions of personal slight ever accorded visitors to 
Australia‟.163 A Darwin resident similarly decried the „cold courtesy‟ Australians 
had shown to the tour. The letter also mentioned declared „the only other countries 
which adopt the Australian attitude towards the Japanese are Russia and Red 
China‟.164 Whilst less explicit in other responses this letter shows that the 
communist threat continued to make the Australian public aware of the need for 
more positive relations with Japan. Indeed the influence of communism on opinion 
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was particularly strong at this time due to the May 1954 „Petrov Affair‟, whereby 
two Soviet agents defected to Australia, and the ongoing „Royal Commission on 
Espionage; events which, as Robert Manne has shown, captured the public 
imagination.
165
 Other responses echoed the sentiments of Prime Minister Menzies 
and felt that a movement beyond the war was now needed, with one commentator 
arguing that if German visitors were welcomed, so should the Japanese.
166
 These 
responses showed that the complementary image of Japan, born from the success of 
prior changes, was slowly altering how Australians responded to change in the 
Australia-Japan relationship and to Japan itself. 
A New Way of Looking at Japan? Public Response to the Changes of 1953 and 
1954 
The years 1953 and 1954 saw the complementary image of Japan grow steadily in 
influence alongside the older, stronger antagonistic image of Japan. The controversy 
over Mr. Nishi‟s immigration statements and the 1954 survey show that whilst the 
public was increasingly open to change in the Australia-Japan relationship, it 
remained adamant that change be limited to areas where it was beneficial or did not 
threaten. The Government also altered its own view of Japan and begin to put forth, 
in a coordinated manner, a new image of Japan that saw developments in the 
relationship, such as relaxing trade, as advantageous to Australia‟s interests and 
development. The new Government approach to Japan, and its dedication to lead 
public opinion, was demonstrated by a November 1954 cabinet decision to adopt a 
new „liberal policy‟ towards Japan; a decision stemming largely from two factors. 
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Firstly, the ever increasing value of the Australia-Japan trade demanded 
Government adopt a more positive approach towards Japan,
167
 Secondly, the „the 
very real danger of Japan becoming aligned with Communist China‟ demanded 
Australia be more proactive in encouraging Japan to remain in the anti-Communist 
„camp‟.168 One of the most important parts of this new approach was, for this 
thesis‟s purpose, the Government‟s commitment to lead public opinion. The 
Government acknowledged the strength of the antagonistic image of Japan and 
specified that consultations with the community, along with Government 
explanations, would accompany change to ensure the „maximum support of the 
public‟.169 Whilst far from dominant by the end of 1954 the positive reception given 
to the Japanese baseball team who toured Australia in December 1954 shows that 
Australian‟s increasingly perceived closer relations, under certain circumstances, 
with Japan as mutually beneficial. The result was that by May 1955, as Ambassador 
Nish departed Australia, Richard Casey could remark with confidence that 
„Australian-Japanese feeling is a great deal better than it was when he arrived two 
and a half years ago‟.170  
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-Chapter Three- 
An Image in Ascendancy? Australia Views Japan Anew, 1958-1960 
‘The Arts can play a most significant role in furthering goodwill and understanding 
amongst people everywhere,  and I hope that with this exhibition our countries will 
come more closely to understand and appreciate one another’  
Mr. Tadakatsu Suzuki, Japanese Ambassador to Australia
171
 
 
‘The Commonwealth has a neighbour of immense achievement and power of 
recovery and potential, almost without limit.’  
The Bulletin 
172
 
 
As the end of the decade approached a series of new contacts between Australia and 
Japan were forged, ranging from a new trade Agreement to a series of art 
exhibitions. These events demonstrate that whilst the antagonistic image of Japan 
remained influential it was increasingly being rivalled in importance by the new, 
complementary image of Japan that was enthusiastically promoted by the 
Australian, and from 1957, the Japanese Governments. From 1955 onwards 
Japanese economic development had rapidly accelerated and by 1958 Japan was in 
the midst of its second great boom period, a period in which its commitment to 
expanding its heavy industrial and technological exports began to bear fruits.
173
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Consequently Japan sought both new markets and new sources of raw materials. 
Australia was well placed to supply both and in 1957 „The Agreement On 
Commerce Between The Commonwealth Of Australia And Japan‟ was signed. The 
Commerce Agreement was undoubtedly important however it must not be viewed in 
isolation or allowed to overshadow the contributions of other changes, a tendency 
which many studies of the Agreement unfortunately succumb to. Indeed J.G. 
Crawford, a former senior member of the Department of Trade, writing in 1968, saw 
it as the dominant driver behind the expansion of contacts with Japan in the 
1960s.
174 
 In contrast it will be this thesis‟s argument that the Agreement should be 
seen as part a far longer process of change, it resulted from the success of prior 
limited changes and like them remained limited by the antagonistic image of 
Japan.
175
  This is not to say that the Agreement was not important but rather that it 
should be seen as one of many developments that helped foster the growth of the 
complementary image of Japan. The Commerce Agreement, art exhibitions, and 
trade fairs thus resulted from the growth of a new image of Japan and served to 
promote this image of Japan, an image which presented Japan as a modern nation 
who benefitted Australia‟s own development economically and culturally.  
The Continuing March of Incremental Change:  Public Response to the 1957 
Australia-Japan Commerce Agreement  
Government leadership had assisted in the emergence of the complementary image 
of Japan throughout 1953 and 1954 and it remained important in the debate over the 
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Commerce Agreement. The Government continually argued that the Agreement was 
necessary to safeguard Australia‟s markets in Japan which, by 1957, were 
increasingly important to the national interest.
176
  Throughout discussion of the 
Agreement the Government depicted Japan as a nation who complemented 
Australia‟s development, as Prime Minister Menzies declared simply in 1957 the 
Agreement was „a sound step in Australia‟s march to a great economic future‟.177 
Similarly the Minister for Trade, John McEwen, stated that the Commerce 
Agreement would help foster „a trading relationship that would endure‟.178 However 
despite this constant stream of assurances the influence that the antagonistic image 
of Japan exerted remained strong and fears were voiced that the Commerce 
Agreement would see Japanese goods flood the market and threaten Australian 
jobs.
179
 In response to such claims McEwen argued the Agreement‟s requirement 
that the Japanese exercise „voluntary restraint‟ and limit the quantity of exports to 
prevent harm to Australian industry would be sufficient to show that such fears were 
ungrounded.
180
 Indeed, the success of the Japanese in exercising such self restraint 
undoubtedly helped further expand the influence of the complementary image of 
Japan by proving that Japan did not aim to threaten Australia. However in 1957 such 
a clause did little to soothe public discontent, and as a result McEwen detailed other 
safeguards, such as his declaration that the government could, if needed, „act in a 
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day‟ to stop Japanese imports from damaging Australian jobs and industry.181 
Talking on television in late 1957 McEwen continued to emphasise that Australian 
jobs were the Government‟s priority; „it‟s my job‟, McEwen declared, „to see they 
[the Japanese] don‟t succeed [in increasing imports] to the point of damaging our 
industry‟.182 However the limits placed on the Commerce Agreement were not just 
empty rhetoric, as an „Industry Panel‟ was established to enable affected industries 
to appeal for protection from Japanese imports.
183
 Such consultation undoubtedly 
helped foster public acceptance of the Agreement by showing the government was 
indeed committed to protecting Australian jobs. The Government thus moved 
quickly to explain the Commerce Agreement to the public, emphasising change 
would be limited and beneficial. Such explanations demonstrate that rather than a 
watershed moment, in and of itself, the Commerce Agreement was the result, and a 
continuation, of prior changes that the 1950s had seen occur to the Australia-Japan 
relationship and public perceptions of Japan. 
The necessity of the Government‟s explanations of limitations was highlighted 
through the strong opposition to the Agreement voiced by many sections of the 
Australian public. Tellingly the majority of such opposition focused primarily on the 
threat Japanese goods posed to jobs and living standards. Textile manufacturers 
particularly feared Japanese competition, and The Associated Woolen and Worsted 
Manufacturers of Australia attacked the Commerce Agreement for lacking sufficient 
safeguards whilst the Associated Chambers of Manufacturers, who ran an extensive 
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campaign against the Agreement, argued that relying on the Japanese to exercise 
voluntary restraint was „to say the least, an extraordinary situation‟.184  John 
Crundall Knitting Mills went a step further and deliberately invoked wartime 
memories declaring in a full page advertisement that „The Japanese didn‟t beat us by 
the sword but they appear to have beaten U.S.A, Canada, and now Australia, by the 
pen‟.185 The A.C.T.U travelled to Canberra to discuss the Commerce Agreement 
with John McEwen, where it rather bombastically declared that „in this trade war the 
Japanese cannot be trusted any more than they could be trusted in military 
warfare‟.186 These responses showed that the antagonistic image of Japan still 
remained a powerful influence upon public opinion regarding Japan in 1957, and 
such influence subsequently demanded that changes be limited and beneficial in 
nature. However, it is important to note few rejected the need for the Commerce 
Agreement. Indeed at its 1957 Annual Congress the A.C.T.U demanded rejection of 
the current Agreement whilst calling for a trading relationship „more in keeping with 
the mutual interests of both countries‟; at no point did it argue that the Agreement, in 
principle, was not needed.
187
 The issue was clearly, as in the 1954 Survey 
controversy, not so much change itself but where the limits to change lay.   
Whilst the continuing influence of the antagonistic image of Japan made opposition 
to the Agreement inevitable it was also clear that the public was increasingly 
influenced by a new, Government endorsed, image of Japan. A July 1957 Gallup 
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Poll captured the complexity of public opinion through its discovery that although 
only 17% of the public opposed the Commerce Agreement, support was far from 
comprehensive with only 38% in favour. The remaining 45% declared they were 
undecided.
188
  Under the influence of the two images of Japan public opinion 
remained cautious out until proof of the Agreement‟s benefits was clearly 
demonstrated. Interestingly, newspaper opinion was significantly less cautious, as 
The Age and Sydney Morning Herald declared that safeguards were sufficient and 
that Australia was sure to „reap the benefits.189 Melbourne‟s The Catholic News 
Weekly was similarly positive and applauded McEwen for „his firm stand against the 
noisy warnings and threats‟ being voiced.190 The Associated Chambers of 
Commerce was also a major supporter of the Commerce Agreement, and lauded it as 
„a major achievement‟. Primary producers were, as in 1953 and 1954, extremely 
supportive, and the Graziers Federal Council of Australia stated rather bluntly that 
Mr McEwen „has done a good job‟.191 These views demonstrate that whilst the 
public remained cautious it was increasingly open to change in the Australia-Japan 
relationship. Whilst the process of change begun in 1951 was ongoing it was 
undeniable that by 1957 a significant change in how Australian‟s viewed Japan had 
occurred. 
Public support for the Commerce Agreement increased markedly as the Commerce 
Agreement entered operation, as demonstrated by a September 1957 Gallup Poll 
which showed that support had grown to 45% of respondents. This number 
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continued to grow, and by April 1959 it was shown that 52% of those questioned 
supported the Commerce Agreement with only 24% opposed.
192
 Even the A.C.T.U, 
at its 1959 Congress, felt compelled to declare that Japanese self-restraint had „been 
beyond criticism‟ and thanked John McEwen for his consultation.193 Consequently 
the renegotiation of the Commerce Agreement in 1963 was enthusiastically 
supported by the public.
194
 This support undoubtedly stemmed from the success of 
the Commerce Agreement however it must be noted that this success was dependent 
upon the existence of appropriate limitations, such as Japanese „voluntary restraint‟ 
and the ability of the Government to stop imports. The public demand for such 
limitations demonstrates that the antagonistic image of Japan remained a force to be 
reckoned with. However it also clear that from 1957 the public were increasingly 
associating a new image with Japan, an image which depicted Japan as a modern, 
unthreatening nation whose relationship with Australia was characterised by 
reciprocal benefits. These two images would continue to shape public opinion 
regarding Japan for the remaining years of the 1950s and demonstrate that, whilst 
important, the Agreement neither marked the end of animosity nor the beginning of 
an era of uninhibited expansion of contacts with Japan. 
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The Continuing Growth of the Complementary Image of Japan: Art 
Exhibitions and Popular Culture Representations of Japan in 1958 
Following the Commerce Agreement the Australia-Japan relationship continued to 
grow, most notably in the burgeoning interest the Australian public showed in 
Japanese culture. This new change was highlighted by the popularity of two art tours 
that took place in 1958 which, as David Sissons has noted, demonstrated that the 
more difficult changes of prior years had led to increasing acceptance of Japan 
within the Australian public.
195
 Furthermore the art tours also served to further 
reinforce and promote the complementary image of Japan through their promotion 
of a positive view of Japanese culture and Japan itself. Whilst such promotion of 
Japan was not unprecedented, the art exhibitions showed that the Japanese 
Government was increasingly making a concerted effort to „sell‟ itself to the 
Australian public.  It must be noted that the exhibitions only visited the State 
Galleries of Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and New South Wales. They 
were not attended by all Australians and thus their impact must be appraised 
realistically. However the very fact that such exhibitions took place, with 
Government support and public acceptance, demonstrates that Australian‟s view of 
Japan had changed significantly since the beginning of the decade. By 1958 the 
public was increasingly accepting of change to the Australia-Japan relationship and, 
in some areas of the community, was openly enthusiastic about closer cultural and 
economic ties with Japan 
The late 1950s saw Asia assume a greater presence in the national life of Australia, 
as interest in Australia‟s northern neighbours grew and the need for a new, 
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constructive approach to Asia was increasingly acknowledged by many Australian 
intellectuals.
196
 Due to the increasing trade relationship with Japan and the long, 
albeit turbulent, history of the Australia-Japan relationship, Japan was at the 
forefront of this movement and by the end of the decade a positive image of Japan 
was regularly seen in popular culture. American movies  such as „The Barbarian and 
the Geisha‟ (1958), the Academy Award Winning „Sayonara‟ (1957) and Jerry 
Lewis‟ „The Geisha Boy‟ (1958) all brought Japan into the daily life of Australians 
and encouraged them to perceive Japan as an alluring and exotic nation. Whilst 
achieved through a variety of means one of the most significant manners in which 
films promoted this image was the role played by women. Just as the romantic tale 
of the war brides had done much to increase public acceptance of them so too did 
the romantic tales of films such as „Sayonara‟, where an American GI and a 
Japanese girl fall in love, help further a positive image of Japan.
197
 The Australian 
Women’s Weekly full colour review of „Sayonara‟ paid particular attention to the 
films romance and alluring Japanese setting, demonstrating their role in promoting a 
complementary image of Japan (Fig. 5).
198
 Whilst it is difficult to completely gauge 
the effect of these films, it is undeniable that they sparked greater interest in Japan 
and presented Japan as unthreatening and alluring. In doing so they formed a 
valuable part of the contemporary environment in which the influence of the 
complementary image of Japan over public opinion was growing.  
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A month prior to the release of „Sayonara‟ Australia saw the first of several major 
tours of Japanese Art when the Hiroshima Panels visited Australian capital cities. 
The Hiroshima Panels were a series of charcoal drawings that told the story of the 
direct aftermath of the Hiroshima Atom Bombing as Japanese civilians searched for 
survivors and survival in the ruins of what had been, moments prior, their homes. 
The Panels touched on one of the most contentious aspects of the Australia-Japan 
relationship, the war, and their positive reception was not only a testament to 
Australian‟s strong sense of sympathy to victims of war but was also illustrative of a 
desire to move beyond the antagonistic image of Japan. The Panels were visited by 
hundreds of thousands of Australians with The Australian Women’s Weekly 
reporting that the Adelaide crowds were the biggest on record, whilst the Art Gallery 
Fig.5 An image from the Australian Women’s Weekly review of the film 
„Sayonara‟. From 1958 onwards Australians increasingly were exposed to 
an alluring, romanticised view of Japan.  
The Australian Women’s Weekly, 30April 1958. 
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of New South Wales called the exhibition one of the year‟s most „impressive and 
popular‟.199 This popularity shows that under the influence of a new, positive and 
government endorsed image of Japan the Australian public was beginning to move 
beyond the legacy of decades of anti-Japanese sentiment and engage in a variety of 
contacts with Japan. The Hiroshima Panels also show that the fear of communism 
remained a powerful influence on public opinion in 1958. The Panel‟s presented a 
horrifying warning to the Australian public on the dangers of a nuclear war; a war 
that many Australians feared could begin at any moment.
200
 Indeed, The Australian 
Women’s Weekly, The Bulletin and Daily Telegraph called upon Australians to see 
the panels for their high quality and sincere warning to the world of the „horrors of 
modern war‟, whilst a letter to The Age applauded the panels „horrifying lesson‟ on 
the impacts of „vile war‟.201 The positive public reception given to the Hiroshima 
Panel‟s, the result of continuing fears of communism and the success of prior 
changes, demonstrates that by 1958 common ground was increasingly being found 
between Australia and Japan. 
Whilst the overwhelming interest shown in the Panels illustrated that Australians 
had, by 1958, come to acknowledge the benefits of close ties with Japan it must also 
be acknowledged that the antagonistic image of Japan remained strong and approval 
of the Exhibition was not universal. One letter to The Sydney Morning Herald 
questioned the catalogue‟s, written by an Australian, „strong words‟ and argued that 
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we should never forget the thousands killed by „the knights of Bushido‟.202 Whilst 
the statement was refuted by other letters to the paper, such as one commentator 
who declared that „here is no cry for tears on behalf of the Japanese people‟ but 
rather „two artists sincere warning to humanity‟, the comment showed wartime 
memories remained strong.
203
 Whilst such negative opinions were in the minority 
they remain important and demonstrate that public opinion in the late 1950s was 
shaped by two quite different, yet interrelated, images of Japan; one spoke of 
Japan‟s threat to Australia, whilst the other argued the Australia-Japan relationship 
was reciprocal and a force for good.  
Building upon the success of the Hiroshima Panels Australian tour November 1958 
saw another artistic tour, this time of Contemporary Japanese Art. The Exhibition 
showed that Australians were increasingly accepting of greater contact with Japan 
and viewed Japanese culture with growing interest. Notably, the Exhibition was the 
result of attempts made by the Japanese Ambassador, beginning in 1956, to organise 
an exhibition of modern Japanese art and was funded by both the Australian and 
Japanese government.
204
 This involvement demonstrated that by 1958 both the 
Japanese and Australian governments were active in promoting a complementary 
image of Japan, a significant break with the past. The exhibition was touted as an 
unprecedented insight into the art and culture of modern Japan, which was presented 
at the exhibition and elsewhere as unthreatening and complementary to Australia.  
Indeed the Ambassador for Japan, Mr. Tadakatsu Suzuki, made such a purpose 
explicit when, in his forward to the exhibition‟s catalogue, he expressed hope that 
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the exhibition would allow Australians and Japanese to „more closely understand 
and appreciate one another‟.205 The tour was accompanied by both the Japanese 
Ambassador and a noted Tokyo Art Critic, Mr Kenjiro Okamoto, who gave lectures 
on contemporary Japanese society and Japan‟s artistic history, all of which aimed to 
foster interest in Japan.
206
 Such a goal was shared by the principal Australian 
organiser, the Art Gallery of New South Wales, who called it „large and important‟ 
due to its encouragement of friendship and understanding between the two 
nations.
207
 Although newspaper reviews were mixed, with many critics less than 
enthused about the art itself, the vast majority were positive about the concept of the 
exhibition and noted its importance in furthering understanding between Australia 
and Japan and hoped for further exchanges.
208
 Upon the Contemporary Art 
Exhibition‟s return to Japan, the director of the Art Gallery of NSW, Hal 
Misingham, stated that the state galleries all agreed the exhibition had been of 
immense value to the Australian public on both „its artistic level and on the 
undoubted influence it could have in the fostering of a more amicable relationship 
between Japan and Australia.‟209 The Contemporary Art Exhibition showed that 
Australians were increasingly interested in Japanese culture and were far more 
accepting of change to the Australia-Japan relationship than they had been in the 
opening years of the 1950s. Whilst the antagonistic image of Japan remained 
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influential the exhibition should be seen as both the result and a further promotion of 
the complementary image of Japan. Indeed by 1958 it was clear that some segments 
of the Australian public, such as the art community, were campaigning for closer 
ties with Japan.  
‘See Japan as it Really Is!’ 210 – Promoting the Complementary Image of Japan 
at the 1959 Japanese Trade Fair  
In January 1959 Sydney and Melbourne played host to an immensely popular 
Japanese Trade Fair, an event which attested to the significant influence the 
complementary image of Japan now exerted over public opinion. This thesis has 
argued that change in the Australia-Japan relationship was an incremental process, 
characterised by precise limits to change and Government leadership. Whilst much 
distance had been covered these same aspects of change in the Australia-Japan 
relationship were on show at the 1959 Trade Fair. The Australian Minister for 
Trade, John McEwen, opened the Fair in Sydney and his speech again put forward 
an image of Japan as a modern and growing nation who offered great benefits to 
Australia. The Fair was also used by its Japanese organisers as an opportunity to 
promote the complementary image of Japan with the Fair presented, and received, as 
demonstrative of Japans unthreatening nature. The 1959 Trade Fair thus showed that 
by the end of the decade public opinion in Australia regarding Japan was 
increasingly positive, a shift that was undeniably due to the path of incremental 
change that the Australia-Japan relationship in 1950s had followed.  
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A decade of incremental change had brought about major changes to public opinion, 
changes which the leadership of government played a crucial role in bringing about. 
Indeed writing in 1965 Sir James Plimsoll, a noted Australian diplomat and head of 
the Department of External Affairs, considered the shift in Australian public opinion 
regarding Japan an example of the valuable role government could play in 
promoting goodwill between nations.
211
 The 1959 Trade Fair demonstrated that the 
Government remained a crucial advocate of the new, positive image of Japan in the 
final years of the decade, a task which the Japanese themselves now took up with 
gusto. In his opening speech John McEwen placed emphasis on the reciprocal nature 
of the Australia-Japan relationship by pointing out that as Japan grew it consumed 
more Australian primary resources, whilst Australia‟s growth in turn demanded 
more Japanese heavy industrial machinery. Indeed Japan‟s commitment to heavy 
industrial growth and its consequent rapid growth was, by 1959, capturing the 
imagination of Australians; a nation who found its own economy benefitted from, 
and fuelled, such development. From 1955 onwards Japan had rapidly urbanised and 
industrialised and seen a dramatic rise in wages, living standards and prosperity; by 
1959 Japan was rapidly becoming regarded as a fully fledged modern nation.
212
 
Such development sparked greater interest in Japan amongst the Australian public; it 
demonstrated that Japan‟s rise was not necessarily antagonistic to Australia‟s 
prosperity and safety.  
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By 1959 Japan was beginning a new phase in its rapid economic growth, chief of 
which was a concerted drive to expand economically overseas.
213
 Whilst Japan had 
begun as early as 1957 to promote itself in Australia the Fair saw a far more focused 
effort to demonstrate that Australia‟s „increasing development and prosperity‟ would 
not be threatened by Japan whose goods were of „the highest international 
standards‟.214 It was joined in this effort by McEwen even went so far as to describe 
the Australia-Japan trading relationship as „comparable to the relationship of the 
Australian economy to the United Kingdom‟. Such a comment, at a time when 
Australia remained fiercely protective of its white British identity, was undeniably a 
testament to just how far public opinion regarding Japan had shifted during the 
1950s. However McEwen‟s speech was also a testament to the ongoing influence of 
the antagonistic image of Japan with the limits to change constantly asserted and the 
Government emphasising that action had been, and would continue to be, taken 
whenever threats emerged.
215
 In his own opening speech the Japanese organiser, Mr. 
S. Tanabe, similarly acknowledged the impact of the antagonistic image of Japan by 
noting that the „cheap and nasty‟ goods of pre-war days had damaged Japan‟s 
reputation and dramatically affected Australian‟s responses to Japan and its goods. 
However, for Tanabe these were the „old days‟.216  The Japan of the 1959 Trade Fair 
was thus positioned as beneficial to Australia‟s own interests, a message which, after 
a decade of incremental change, the public was increasingly receptive to.  
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The 1959 Trade Fair was undeniably only made possible by the shift in public 
opinion that had resulted from the ever growing influence of a new image of Japan. 
However it was also clearly an event which sought to promote this image by 
showing visitors that the rapidly industrialising Japan, far from being antagonistic, 
complemented their daily lives and living standards. The goods displayed at the fair 
covered a wide ground and ranged from Japan‟s most traditional export, textiles, to 
its increasingly renowned expertise in electronic and heavy machinery industries. 
Newspapers were particularly interested in the amount of household items, such as 
televisions and fans, and luxury items, such as cameras, cigarette lighters, on 
display. By the late 1950s Australians were increasingly able to afford such luxury 
goods, and the displays thus struck upon the growing consumerist instinct of 
Australians.
217
 Rather than threatening the Australian „way of life‟, Japan was now 
presented as a modern nation offering goods to complement it. The high quality of 
the goods on display was often noted by visitors and seen as indicative of Japan‟s 
modernity and further proof that it was not antagonistic to Australia. The Bulletin 
noted that Japan‟s name was no longer associated with „shodiness and extreme 
cheapness‟ whilst Japan‟s conduct as a trading partner was held by the Daily 
Telegraph to be exemplary and it was acknowledged as „one of our most valued 
customers‟.218 Perhaps the best summary of the impact of the Fair‟s display of goods 
can be found in The Sydney Morning Herald who, in its special report on the Fair, 
noted Japan‟s goods filled gaps „not already covered by home manufacturing.219  
The antagonistic image of Japan had demanded at the beginning of the 1950s that 
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change, such as trade, be restricted to filling these gaps, and it remained so. Yet it 
was clear that by 1959 the success of Japan in filling these gaps had led to a 
significant change in public opinion, and as the decade drew to a close Japan was 
increasingly perceived by the Australian public as a nation which complemented 
their own.  
Whilst goods were the central aspect of the Trade Fair, Japanese culture also played 
an important role in promoting an image of Japan as unthreatening and alluring. On 
the whole 1959 saw a rapid expansion in the presence of Japanese culture in 
Australia with a variety of fashion parades, arts exhibitions and even a visit to 
Australia by fifteen Japanese University students.
220
 The Fair was thus riding a wave 
of growing interest in Japanese culture, interest that undoubtedly owed much to the 
success of previous changes. Each day of the Fair saw three sessions of Japanese 
films, parades of fashion, traditional dancing and flower arrangement with all three 
amongst the most popular aspects of the Fair.
221
 Newspapers commented favourably 
upon the impression they gained of Japanese culture from these events and the Fair 
more generally, with The Daily Telegraph noting that Japanese architecture could 
offer great lessons to Australian architects.
222
 The cultural aspects of the 1959 Trade 
Fair also showed that the momentum behind change in the Australia-Japan 
relationship continued to grow. In 1959 Japan was increasingly seen by the public as 
not only as a nation of economic significance but one of significant cultural worth.   
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One of the most interesting aspects of the Japanese Trade Fair was the heavy 
presence of Japanese women, who were used by the Fair to present Japan as 
unthreatening and exotic. Japanese women at the Fair, like their war bride 
predecessors, were perceived as symbolic of a modern Japan and the complete 
reverse of the antagonistic, masculine image that had dominated earlier 
representations of Japan.
223
 The models received rave reviews from both female and, 
the arguably more eager, male audiences; as a reporter from Sydney‟s The Sun 
succinctly put it, „Interested in the mannequins? Yes! Like the Japanese Dancer? My 
word – a little gem!‟.224 Photographs of the models were widely circulated in the 
press and television broadcasts drew attention to the culture on show and the role 
that Japanese women played in such culture (Fig.6). Newspaper reports were also 
attracted to the models who often received a favourable section devoted entirely to 
them; „the only action which broke the poise‟, declared the Sydney Morning Herald, 
was a „giggle stifled by a delicate hand‟.225 Whilst much of the models‟ appeal 
hinged on the allure of the feminine form, their role in furthering a positive, 
attractive and unthreatening image Japan should not be underestimated; if visitors 
encountered one Japanese person at the Fair, it was likely to be a demure and 
alluring model. 
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The value of the models in promoting the complementary image of Japan was 
further demonstrated by an interview with the models in the Australian Women’s 
Weekly. The interview opened by remarking that the famous Trocadero dance hall 
was „rapidly being transformed into a scene like a set from the film „Sayonara‟, a 
comment which showed the major influence the positive image of Japan present in 
films had exerted upon public opinion. The models were then asked, and answered, 
questions on daily life in Japan and their „European dress‟, which was naturally from 
the dresses on display at the Fair.
226
 The models‟ responses not only gave 
Australians a glimpse into the increasing alluring world of Japan, but also showed 
that Japan was far from antagonistic to Australia. On the contrary, Japanese women 
had much in common with Australian women and were presented as complementary 
to Australian life. Such a representation was undoubtedly reinforced by the models 
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Fig.6 A still taken from a television broadcast of the Japanese Trade Fair. 
The Japanese models are performing the traditional Japanese tea ceremony. 
The ceremony was performed three times a day and attracted considerable 
attention from onlookers, as shown in the still.  
 
Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW, Australian Photographic 
Agency - 06264 
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occupation. The message was clear, the model‟s posed no threat but rather brought 
benefits to enrich the lives of Australian women.  
The popularity and success of the Trade Fair was built on the success of years of 
incremental change which had demonstrated to Australian‟s that Japan did not 
necessarily threaten their way of life. The image that had steadily grown since 1953 
was vigorously promoted at the 1959 Trade Fair and aimed to convince Australian‟s 
that Japan was a modern, rapidly growing nation who benefitted their own country‟s 
development. Yet regardless of this image‟s growth, and its increasing allure as 
Australian‟s watched the „economic miracle‟ of Japan begin in earnest, it had not yet 
displaced the older antagonistic image of Japan. This image remained a powerful 
influence on public opinion in 1959 and continued to place limits on the pace and 
extent of change.  
 ‘A New Japan’227 – The 1960 Aki Maru Floating Fair and Japan’s Rising 
Popularity  
December 1960 brought another Japanese exhibition of culture and trade to 
Australia, this time in the form of the „Japanese Industry Floating Fair‟ (JIFF). The 
Fair took place on a Japanese ship, the Aki Maru, which visited Brisbane, Sydney, 
Melbourne, Adelaide, and received rapturous welcomes at all ports with crowds 
waiting for hours to enter the exhibition (Fig.7). The Aki Maru was seen by Japan as 
an opportunity to promote a new and attractive image of itself with the Fair‟s 
organiser, Mr. Michisuke Sugi, declaring the Aki Maru showed Japan‟s potential to 
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„contribute materially to Australian development and production‟.228 The Australian 
government also remained active in propagating such an image in 1960 with the Aki 
Maru attended by a variety of figures such as the Federal Treasurer Harold Holt and 
Minister for Trade John McEwen. McEwen again used the Aki Maru to demonstrate 
and promote the reciprocal relationship between Australian and Japan, however he 
remained adamant that trade would be restricted to goods which „would not damage 
Australian industries‟.229 By 1960 the majority of public opinion agreed with 
McEwen, as shown by a  1960 Gallup Poll that reported that 81% of those who had 
bought Japanese goods found them to be as good, or better, than other nations.
230
 
The fears of the past were slowly being left behind whilst the image of Japan as a 
modern and unthreatening nation increasingly took hold. The movement beyond the 
fears of the past is shown by The Advertiser and a correspondent from Brisbane who 
noted „the real surprise is the range and sophistication of the Made-In-Japan 
goods‟.231 Significant attention was also given to the amount of trade, and the goods 
it consisted of. The Sydney Morning Herald drew attention to Japanese machinery 
and electronics whilst stating that Japan was Australia‟s second best customer.232 
The Advertiser and The Daily Telegraph, who declared the Aki Maru‟s focus was 
„tyres, transistors, turbines and ships‟, also saw the trade as complementary and saw 
great hope for future expansion.
233
 These reactions show that the antagonistic image 
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of Japan, whilst remaining influential, was increasingly being rivalled in importance 
by the complementary image of Japan. Public opinion towards Japan was in 1960 
more positive than it ever had been before. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst the Aki Maru itself was the result of a decade of incremental change and 
steady growth in the new, Government supported, image of Japan it also served to 
promote this image by presenting Australian‟s with a wide display of goods that 
benefitted, rather than threatened, their daily life. Whilst the Aki Maru focused 
heavily on industry it also had a substantial section dedicated to household goods 
and curiosities which appealed to ordinary visitors. Household appliances, such as 
irons, televisions and ovens, gained significant attention as did the wide range of 
Japanese automobiles.
234
 These items were deliberately aimed at particular sections 
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Fig.7 A photograph of crowds in Brisbane waiting to enter the Aki Maru Trade Fair. 
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of Australian society, particularly women, and sought to show the benefits to be 
gained from the Australia Japan relationship. As the Japan Trade Bulletin tellingly 
stated in its review of the household appliances on display, „The Australian 
housewife will find this section of particular interest, because it introduces a 
remarkable number of quality products‟.235 The Aki Maru also sold a variety of 
souvenirs and held explosively popular firework exhibitions at each port of call, 
further courting public interest in both the Fair and Japan.
236
 Newspapers ran many 
articles, all positive, on products such as cameras and demonstrate that public 
opinion increasingly saw Japan as a source of benefits, not of fears, with The Daily 
Telegraph marvelling at the „astounding technique and quality‟ of Japanese 
cameras.
237
 Similarly The Courier Mail and The Advertiser were infatuated with the 
„gadgets‟ on display, such as a portable television set, a fish detector and a 
„matchbox size‟ transistor radio.238 The Aki Maru thus showed the decade of prior, 
limited changes had created an ever increasing enthusiasm amongst the Australian 
public for further contacts with Japan. However this public support remained reliant 
on such changes appearing unthreatening and beneficial. 
A Nation to Benefit and Complement: Public Opinion Regarding Japan after a 
Decade of Change 
Over the 1950s a series of changes had occurred to the Australia-Japan relationship 
that had in turn led to changes in how Australians saw their northern neighbour. The 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
235
 Japan Export Trade Promotion Agency, Japan Trade Bulletin, 1, no.4 (November 1960), p.5. 
 
236
 „Commonwealth of Australia Minute Paper – Exhibition Details and Custom Requirements‟, 
D596 1960/1444, NAA. 
 
237
 The Daily Telegraph, 5 December 1960. 
 
238
 The Courier Mail,29 November 1960; The Advertiser, 19 December 1960. 
 
84 | P a g e  
 
antagonistic image had reigned supreme at the beginning of the decade and had 
stipulated changes occur slowly and with precise limits. Yet as these changes 
occurred and proved beneficial a new complementary image of Japan began to 
emerge, and by the time the Aki Maru arrived in Australia it was exerting 
considerable influence on public opinion regarding Japan. By 1960 Japan was 
regarded as a modern nation who offered great benefits to Australia, as shown by 
The Sydney Morning Herald who noted Japan‟s „increasingly high living 
standards‟.239 Similarly The Advertiser held the Aki Maru as indicative of Japans 
modernity and „high standing in the world‟, a standing Japan was „entitled‟ to.240 
Whilst slowly emerging throughout the 1950s this interest in Japan‟s modernity 
would grow rapidly in the years to come as Japan‟s „economic miracle‟ captured the 
imagination of Australian‟s. Indeed by 1965 Donald Horne would remark „Australia 
is not the most “modern” nation in “Asia”; Japan is‟.241 Whilst fears of Japan had 
not yet met their demise by the time the Aki Maru visited Australia, it was clear a 
fundamental shift in Australian public opinion regarding Japan had taken place. By 
1960 Australians not only regarded Japan as a new, modern and complementary 
nation, they were also increasingly enthusiastic about the future prospects of the 
Australia-Japan relationship.  
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-Conclusion- 
The Results of a Decade of Change 
The post-war era of Australian history has been widely studied and the Australia-
Japanese relationship has been no exception. However the overwhelming majority 
of studies have focused on changes in governmental policy, and the question of 
public opinion has remained sadly underexplored. This thesis has sought to fill such 
a gap by exploring the shifts in public opinion regarding Japan that the 1950s 
brought and has argued that the principal reason for these shifts was the emergence 
of the complementary image of Japan. Once a nation who had inspired fears in the 
Australian public, and its leaders, the 1950s saw the Australian public readjust its 
view of Japan. By the close of the decade the image Australians were increasingly 
associating with Japan was one of a modern, unthreatening and culturally 
sophisticated nation who offered benefits to Australia‟s own economic and cultural 
development. Whilst the influence of the complementary image of Japan had grown 
greatly over the 1950s it remained in a complex and intimate relationship with the 
antagonistic image of Japan. This older, negative image of Japan, formed at the 
beginning of the century and reinforced in wartime, continued to limit the extent of 
change to the Australia-Japan relationship. Thus even after a decade of pronounced 
and positive change to the Australia-Japan relationship the Australian public 
remained fearful of any rumours that Japan was seeking to migrate south. 
Regardless of its limitations the large scale emergence of a new, positive and 
alluring image of Japan was without precedent and shows that the 1950s was a time 
of great and important change for the Australia-Japan relationship, an era in which 
long held assumptions about Japan were questioned and in some cases overturned.  
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The first foundations for a new image of Japan were laid in 1951 and 1952, when 
the dominance of the antagonistic image of Japan was largely uncontested. The 
Peace Treaty revived fears of Japan and was universally disliked; however it was 
begrudgingly accepted by the public all the same. Crucial to this acceptance was the 
perceived threat of communism, Government leadership and the limitations, 
especially the Pacific Pact, accompanying the Peace Treaty; all of which would 
remain prominent features of change in the Australia-Japan relationship in the years 
ahead. The acceptance of Japanese war brides and Japanese imports also 
demonstrated that the public was prepared to accept change, even though it 
remained fearful of Japan. Such changes marked the beginning of a process of 
incremental change that would characterise the decade, result in the emergence of a 
new image Japan and trigger a shift in how the public perceived, and interacted with, 
Japan.  
The years 1953 and 1954 saw the complementary image of Japan emerge fully and 
steadily expand its influence over the Australian public, although it did so alongside 
the still strong antagonistic image of Japan. The Government began in 1953 to 
promote the image in earnest, and spoke regularly to the public on the need for 
changes to the Australia-Japan relationship. Central to the Government‟s message 
was the notion that change to the Australia-Japan relationship was beneficial and, 
due to the strong limits placed on such change, was unthreatening.  Where change 
exceeded such limits and revived fears of Japan the result was public condemnation, 
thus in 1954 the U.S proposal for Japanese crewed surveys of Australian waters was 
universally rejected by the public. The years of 1953 and 1954 continued the process 
of incremental change and saw a new, positive and attractive image of Japan emerge 
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and gain public acceptance, however its influence remained constrained by the 
antagonistic image of Japan.  
As the end of the decade approached further growth in the influence of the 
complementary image of Japan was seen as Australians began to interact with Japan 
in new and diverse ways.  The 1957 Commerce Agreement showed fears of Japan 
remained strong yet the Agreement was accepted by the public due to its built in 
limitations, Government explanations and the proven success of prior changes in 
trading arrangements. The years that followed saw a series of Japanese art 
exhibitions and trade fairs take place around Australia that were used by both the 
Australian and Japanese Governments to promote Japan as a modern and alluring 
nation. These cultural events showed that the new image of Japan was gradually 
expanding in influence and made the Australian public open to greater ties with a 
nation who was increasingly regarded as a beneficial and sophisticated neighbour.  
The rise of the complementary image of Japan and public acceptance of change 
owed much to Government leadership over the course of the 1950s. Perhaps the 
most important affect of government leadership was that it helped Australians 
understand the changes occurring around them and place them in a wider context. 
Prime Minister Menzies addressed the public on Japanese trade, yet he placed such 
changes in a wider context of moving beyond wartime animosities. Such speeches 
undoubtedly helped the public redefine its views and position on the Australia-Japan 
relationship. Whilst it is difficult to completely gauge the effect of such leadership it 
has been this thesis‟s contention that the role of government was instrumental in 
enabling the emergence of an image of Japan that presented it as alluring, beneficial 
and unthreatening; an occurrence that was undoubtedly crucial to the subsequent 
growth in positive public opinion regarding Japan  
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Another crucial development which helped the complementary image of Japan grow 
was the conduct of Japan itself. Sadly this thesis has unable to fully delve into this 
issue, but it has sought to make clear that Japan played a leading role in shaping 
Australian perceptions of Japan and which increased in decades since. From 1957 
onwards the Japanese exercised a strict policy of self-restraint on trade which not 
only negated fears of dumping but boosted public confidence in Japan and the 
Australia-Japan relationship more generally. It is also clear from 1957 onwards that 
the Japanese began a concerted effort to sell their nation to Australians. Events such 
as trade fairs and art exhibitions promoted Japan as a nation of benefit and allure for 
Australians. Thus as the end of the decade approached Australians were increasingly 
influenced by a new, complementary image of Japan.   
Also important were developments within Japan over the course of the decade, again 
an aspect which this thesis has been unable to fully explore. Japan‟s early 
commitment to raise living standards through trade, which focused on Japanese 
technological and heavy industrial exports, both allayed Australian fears that Japan 
would remilitarise and also resulted in Australian and Japanese economic 
development becoming mutually beneficial and reinforcing.
242
 Whilst historian 
Laura E. Hein has convincingly shown Japanese post-war growth was far from the 
effortless task it has been made out to be it remains that for many observers at the 
time Japan‟s revival was seen as a story of uninhibited success.243  Whilst always 
tempered by remaining suspicion this view gained widespread currency within 
Australia from 1957 onwards as Japanese growth, and demand for Australian goods, 
accelerated. Consequently the image of Japan as a modern, powerful and 
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complementary nation grew ever stronger in Australia. In short Japan, both self 
consciously and unwittingly, found itself expanding the influence the 
complementary image of Japan exerted upon Australian public opinion. 
It should also be acknowledged that the shift in public opinion regarding Japan was 
assisted by the Cold War backdrop against which changes to the Australia-Japan 
relationship took place. Fears of communism had helped immensely in gaining 
public acceptance of the Peace Treaty and they continued to exert a significant 
influence on public opinion regarding Japan throughout the decade. The Menzies 
Government continually restated the threat posed by communism and events such as 
the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Petrov Affair made the Cold War a 
constant present in the lives of Australians.
244
 Whilst the Government was 
particularly influenced by these concerns in its policy towards Japan it is difficult to 
gauge the precise impact upon public opinion. However it can be safely assumed 
that Japan‟s position as an ally in the fight against communism assisted in 
decreasing Australian‟s perceptions of Japan as an antagonistic nation and made 
public opinion more open to change than it ordinarily would have.    
 The complementary image of Japan has continued to develop since the end of the 
1950s, indeed today the image Australians most commonly associate with Japan is 
one a friendly, powerful and beneficial. A recent Lowy Institute Poll found that 83% 
of surveyed Australians trusted Japan to „act responsibly‟ in the world; the same 
amount who trusted the United States. Furthermore Australians ranked Japan fourth 
out of the nations they felt most favourable to.
245
 As Australia and Japan enter what 
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is undoubtedly destined to be an era of great change, tension and progress for their 
shared region, it is important to understand the origins of Australian public support 
for the Australia-Japan relationship. Through understanding the difficulties 
overcome and the distance travelled we not only gain a greater appreciation of the 
importance and ongoing value of the Australia-Japan relationship but derive 
invaluable lessons concerning Australia‟s long and tumultuous engagement with 
Asia.  
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